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FOREWORD
I have frequently been urged to publish the lectures which I
have for som~ years given annually in various cities. The suggestion came both from those who had been unable. to attend the lectures and, more especially, from those who wished to review
them at their leisure.
The difficulty has heretofore been the problem of distribution.
A possible solution has presented itself through the facilities of
The Island Press, a cooperative publishing house, and the World
Events Committee, which has developed extensive connections
throughout the United States and Canada.
I have accordingly decided to try the experiment of publishing
one of the two series of lectures which I gave during the 19441945 lecture season, but brought up to date. If the experiment is
successful, I plan to make it an annual practice, under the series
title Social Science Lectures.
The publishing of the present volume is a cooperative nonprofit undertaking. I have prepared and contributed the manuscript without remuneration; the costs of printing and binding
have been covered by loans without interest from readers of
World Events; the Island Press, which is attending to the manufacture and distribution, is a genuine non-profit cooperative, and
the members of the World Events Committee, who worked out
the financial details and will assist in the distribution, are giving their services without compensation.
Any surplus of recei pts over expenses will be employed to
extend the distribution of this and similar publications. The cooperation of all who are interested will be welcome.
SCOTT NEARING

Jamaica, Vermont
July 1, 1945.
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PREFACE
There is peculiar timeliness in a discussion of the role of the
Soviet Union in world affairs-(l) because the part played, and
to be played, by the Soviet Union is so substantial, (2) because it
is so little understood and (3) because it is so frequently misrepresented. I have studied closely the Russian Revolution and the
Soviet Union, have made six trips to Soviet Russia and have had
opportunities to discuss Soviet policy with many well informed
persons. While I have no idea that I can set the reading public
right on the much discussed issue of Soviet foreign policy, I hope
that I can make some contribution toward brushing away the cobwebs of traditionalism and providing a reasonable viewpoint
from which to consid~r the position of the Soviet Union in the
world of today and tomorrow.
Anyone attempting to write or speak on a general subj ect such
as the relations between the Soviet Union and other nations is
confronted by three serious difficulties: (1) the bigness and
complexity of the matter, (2) its unfamiliarity to an outsider
(foreigner) and (3) the great body of prejudices, preconceptions
and half-truths that all of us carry about. These difficulties are
present in the consideration of many controversial questions, but
in the case of the Soviet Union, with its land mass flung across
two continents, its conglomeration of cultures, races, peoples and
nationalities and its bold attempt to replace an old social system
by a new one, the difficulties are magnified and multiplied.
Writers and speakers on the Soviet Union fall into two main
classes, those who deal with some technical subj ect, such as the
construction of hydro-electric plants or the handling of tubercu10sis' and those who discuss the economic and social structure and
policies. The first group has an easy time of it, since it is necessary merely to survey and report; the second group is hampered
by personal bias and harassed by special interests.
If there is a wholly unprejudiced report on the Soviet Union,
I have never seen it. Some writers, like the Webbs, make an
effort at neutrality. I make no such pretense. I am not neutral
on the Soviet Union. I have been a partisan of the Russian Revo2
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lution since its inception and I am still a partisan of it. Anything
I say or write on the subj ect will necessarily be colored by that
partisanship.
Why am I partisan? I am not Russian, nor were any of my
ancestors, so far as I know. I am not and never have been in the
pay of the Soviet government and, with the exception of two
years, 1927-29, I have not been and am not a member of the
Communist Party. But I am a student of sociology and I am profoundly convinced that a time has come in the development of
social theory and practice when mankind can undertake what
Lester F. Ward called ((the conscious improvement of society by
society" .
I have lived my life in an outmoded social order that is tearing
itself to pieces in a manner which has proved highly expensive in
terms of material wealth, health, life, hopes, aspirations and
ideals. As a teacher of social science, I came in contact with the
youthful victims of this social death agony and was casting about
for some proposal or proposals that would provide a way out for
the lost generation.
This search led me through the literature of social reform and
social revolution. At the outset I was inclined to believe that the
established order could be reformed-that is, preserved in principle and changed only in detail. The economic breakdowns that
preceded W orId War I and then the war itself convinced me that
the present social order is unsound in principle and must therefore be radically altered-that is to say, uprooted and replaced.
I was not and am not committed to .any particular technique of
social revolution. I disagree with Bolshevik theory and practice in
a number of important particulars. But, while we in the west
swallowed the bitter pill of economic paralysis and war, the -Bolsheviks worked out an alternative theory and, at the risk of their
lives, tried to put it into practice. Here was a group of people
with a passionate belief in an ideal, a willingness to make
immense sacrifices in its behalf and wide backing among a sturdy,
uncorrupted people.
Had the Zapata brothers in Mexico or Sun Yat-sen and his
Chinese followers or Gandhi and his Indian multitudes stepped
out with equal boldness, I would have been equally partisan in
3

their behalf. I felt and feel confident that capitalist imperialism
has outlived its usefulness. I am convinced that any effort to keep
the old carcass alive by the injection of artificial stimulants will
result in disillusionment and much unnecessary suffering. I welcome any and every attempt to find a workable substitute.
Soviet Russia to date embodies the most ambitious attempt to
find a way out of the world-wide social crisis precipitated by the
decay of capitalist imperialism and accentuated by the rush of
technological changes and the rapid spread of social science. In
the same sense that the years from 1780 to 1840 are known as the
era of the French Revolution, the years from 1900 to 1950 will
be known in history as the era of the Russian Revolution.
Bolshevism has already profoundly altered the social pattern of
this half-century. Its influence will extend far into the future.
Anyone who pretends to be well informed on the major social
movements of our time must devote serious study to the rise and
development of the Soviet Union. Anyone who is concerned for
the future of mankind must do his thinking, plan his social strategy and formulate his program of social action only after a careful survey of Soviet experience.
In the field of world politics Soviet influence has been felt ever
since the revolution of 1917. During the past five years the Soviet
Union has played a leading political role in both Europe and
Asia. There is every reason to believe that this role will be
enlarged and will extend to the Americas and perhaps to Africa.
Under these circumstances the subject of the role of the Soviet
Union in world affairs becomes a matter of prime importance for
every thinking person.
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I. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
AND THE SOVIET UNION

Events have moved so fast and so far during the last few decades
that it is comparatively difficult for a person living in the current
year to look back over the period that preceded the Russion Revolution. Three things can be said about this pre-revolutionary Victorian
Age. First, the British merchant fleet, the British navy, the British
pound sterling and the British agencies of propaganda spread their
influence even more widely than did the world-girdling British
Empire. It was a.British Age and had been British since the downfall of Napoleon.
Second, the age was characterized by a sense of stability and
permanence that expressed itself in peace, prosperity and a wide~
spread belief in the inevitability of progress. A century elapsed
between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of
World War I. During that century people learned to believe that
men were too civilized to fight another great war and that the
rapidly spreading supply of gadgets that came with mass produc~
tion was ushering in an age of plenty as well as of peace.
Third, the years preceding the Russian Revolution witnessed the
rise of the labor movement. Trade unions, cooperative societies,
political labor parties, fraternal and benefit organizations, sport
associations, literary clubs, large numbers of daily, weekly and
monthly publications, and libraries of books and pamphlets saw
the light of day during the century that ended with World War I.
One of the most remarkable features of the labor movement was
that it came from the masses, who selected their leaders, formulated
their policies, initiated, established, financed and defended their
enterprises by great personal sacrifices and often in the face of
bitter ruling-class opposition.
While the Victorian Age beguiled the heedless -and the ilI~
informed with its superficial appearance of security and stability,
underneath the surface of the western world there was a ferment
that always attends the efforts of a social class, heretofore exploited
5

or frustrated, to secure the reins of power. The Victorian Age
seemed stable. Actually, it was evolving the agencies of its own
destruction.
Profound economic changes underlay the life of the Victorian
world. The most spectacular of these changes had to do with communications and transportation: telegraph, telephone, radio, printing press, camera, locomotive, steamship, automobile, airplane.
The most fundamental of the changes was the phenomenal
stepping-up of. profit accumulation in the industrial centres, where
labor power was concentrated, propagated, psychologized and
systematically exploited. Beyond these transformations lay the developing use of electric energy, the employment of petroleum as
a lubricant and as a fuel, the widespread and cheap production
of machine tools, the growth of synthetics and other factors that
increased human control over nature and facilitated the conversion
of raw materials into finished goods. With this power age went
the mass production of consumer goods, bringing both quantity
and variety of utensils, gadgets and trinkets into the homes of the
masses. Mass production was achieved as the result of a newly
established science of industrial management and organization
that introduced local planning, budgeting, cost-accounting and
bookkeeping as permanent factors in the business world.
Fundamental changes in the means of production are of necessity accompanied by equally "\Yidespread changes in political organization and social relationships. The transformation of 19th
century economy as a result of power techniques moved population~ from old lands into new areas, converted country folk .into
city dwellers, replaced the farm by the factory and office, and thus
laid the foundation for the mass living, mass work, mass education, mass recreation, mass thinking and mass emotional reactions
that are met with in the modern urban community.
The political scene shifted no less rapidly than the economic.
Lenin characterized the epoch from 1870 to 1914 as "the struggle
to redivide the planet". It was during these years that the great
powers of Europe, followed by the United States and later by
Japan, extended their colonial conquests across Africa and through
large parts of Asia. At the same time, they were building bigger
navies and perfecting their armies. A dozen local wars, mostly
6

in Europe, were followed by a period of general war that lasted
from 1911 to 1922.
War was accompanied by revolution. Colonial revolts broke
out in Cuba, the Philippines, and South Africa. The Russian '
Revolution of 1905 was followed by the Mexican Revolution of
1910 and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The Russian Revolution of 1917 spread through Central Europe, North Africa and
the Near East, and fanned the flames, of the quiescent Chinese
Revolution.
Revolution was answered by counter-revolution. From 1918
when Russian landlords, business men, bureaucrats, militarists and
monarchists organized their drive to destroy the Soviet power,
the counter-revolutionary forces of Europe dominated the political scene for decades. British, German and American troops in..
vaded the Soviet Union while the ruling classes in whose interests
they were operating, financed the anti-Soviet Russians. From the
Fascist march on Rome in 1922 to the Nazi seizure of power in
1933, popular and republican governments were swept out of
existence in one European country after another, and in their
place appeared dictatorships, directing managed economies and
building up military machines.
The new World War was rehearsed in Spain from 1936 to
1939. It spread through Europe after 1939 and became a general
war in 1941.
Peace, progress, prosperity and permanence were taken for
granted during the Victorian Age. This seemingly stable social
order was disrupted by a spectacular series of economic changes,
political and military conflicts between the major powers, revolutions and counter-revolutions that wrecked Europe and the world
during the closing years of the 19th and the opening years of the
present century. This is the background of the Soviet Union.
These are the death agonies of an old social system and the birth
pangs of a new one. It was under thes,e world-shaking conditions
that the Russian Revolution took place.
Two facts should never be forgotten about the Russian Revolution. The first is that it was the crest of a revolutionary wave that
moved across the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe during the
first quarter of the 20~ century. The second fact is that the prQ7

fessional revolutionaries of Russia were for the most part eltl1e.1
in exile or in prison when the revolution occurred.
There is always a tendency to personalize historical events and
to localize or nationalize them among particular groups of people.
Thus the names of Lenin and Trotsky are connected with the
Russian Revolution and the Russian Revolution itself is singled
out as though it were the only event of its kind during this
particular period.
Such interpretations are grotesque distortions of the historic
picture. Lenin and Trotsky were both out of Russia when the
Revolution broke. The Russian Revolution of I9I7 occurred seven
years after the Mexican Revolution and six years after the revolution in China. It is true that Lenin and Trotsky were both outstanding revolutionary leaders. It is also true that the Russian
Revolution marked the crest of the revolutionary wave. Headlines
therefore centre on these personalities and on this event, although
the personalities and the event were Hone out of many".
There is another matter that should never be forgotten in a
discussion of the Russian Revolution. The overturn did not come
because revolutionaries wanted it or worked for it. Undoubtedly
their plans and efforts had some effect in shaping its course and
even in giving it birth. But the major factor behind the Russian
Revolution was the inability of the Tzarist regime to function
under the conditions of modern total war.
Tzarist Russia was an anachronism in I9I7. Despite abundant
mineral resources, the country was still overwhelmingly agricultural. Its relations vvith Britain, for example, were substantially
those of colony and mother country. Russia shipped raw materials
to Britain and in exchange the British sold the Russians manufactured goods and invested capital in Russian enterprises. British
and other foreign capitalists even provided technicians to direct
their exploitive activities in Russia because the Russian educational
system was so inadequate that it failed to supply the necessary
number of trained specialists. In political theory, Tzarist Russia
was a great power. In economic fact, its development lagged more
than a hundred years behind that of Britain and at least seventy-five
years behind Germany.
Russia's cultural lag expressed itself equally in the social realm.
S

Not only was the peasantry illiterate but in an age of printing
press, camera, and other ready means of con1munication, government policy limited education, restricted freedom of the press,
and thus denied the masses any possibility of breaking through
the ignorance and superstition that enveloped them.
Britain, 'Germany, France and other European pow·ers had passed
out of the era of landlord domination inlto that of business domina .
tion during the 18th and 19th centuries. Serfdom was not officially
abolished in Russia until 1861, and when the Revolution of 1917
occurred public policy in Russia was still decided in the main by a
bureaucracy that drew its support from the landholders, the army,
the church and the state apparatus. It is not correct to describe the
Russia of 1910 as feudal, because large manufacturing plants
were operating in Petrograd, Kharkov and other cities, extensive
railroad and telegraph systems were functioning, and Russian merchants were actively engaged in world commerce. But the business
interests were definitely subordinate to those of the ruling bureaucracy, and through the entire period that followed the efforts of
Peter the Great to westernize Russia the business interests fought
an uphill fight for a share in the determination of public policy.
When World War I began, Russia was backward economically,
the masses of its people were backward culturally, it had a small
and inadequately trained middle class, and its ruling class was
divided. Such a social set-up might carryon economically and
politically in peace time or during a brief, small-scale war. It was
in no position to handle total war in competition with highly
industrialized, coordinated, modernized Germany.
Two years of war brought Russia to the verge of economic
collapse. Incidentally, of course, the Russian armies had suffered
severe reverses. But the major difficulties were food and munitions
for the fighting fronts, transport facilities, raw materials for industry, fuel and food for the cities. The Russian breakdown in
1916 was a breakdown in supply that affected every branch of
Russian life. The army suffered most, the peasantry least.
Tzarism's political apparatus crumpled in 1917 after the economic and social apparatus had begun to go to pieces. When Liberals
took over in March, the Socialists in midsummer, and the Bolsheviks in November, they assumed control of a bankrupt community.
9

An outdated social system had failed to stand the strain of total
war. Tzarism had gone to pieces under the pressure of the struggle
to redivide the wealth and power of the imperialist world. The
Liberals, Socialists, and Bolsheviks were trustees in bankruptcy
whose duty it was to assemble what assets they could lay their
hands on and reestablish some kind of normal social relationships.
Both the Liberals and the Socialists, for example, tried to continue in the war. Liberals, Socialists and Bolsheviks all attempted
to revive production, restore transport, stabilize fuel and food
supplies and liberate war-weary, hungry, disease-ridden masses
who were desperately seeking peace, bread and a measure of
freedom. It is customary in the United States and elsewhere to
think of the Russian Revolution as a violent and successful attempt
to overthrow Tzarism. Tzarism overthrew itself with the assistance
of. its Central European neighbors. The revolution was an attempt
to modernize an antiquated social machine and set it to running
along reasonably efficient lines.
Behind the revoh:~tion lay a century of social theory, of wideranging discussion and of ardent propaganda. The social theory
found its origins in England and France. Locke, Hume, Rousseau,
Godwin, Fourier, Comte, and many other thinkers in the two
countries were responsible for the 19th century outpouring of
revolutionary theory and attempts at the organization of cooperative
communes. Germany made its contribution through the monumental work of Hegel and Marx. Russia produced Bakunin, Kropotkin and Tolstoy. These theoreticians differed sharply, one from
the other, and when it came to connecting theory and practice,
their planned patterns of a new society were miles apart. But it
was upon their thinking and writing that the ideology of the
labor movement depended. The leaders of the Russian Revolution
had read and discussed these theories in great detail. They were
the heirs of a distinguished group of social planners. They enjoyed
another great advantage. The revolution and the civil war which
followed it liquidated the superstructure of Tzarist society very
thoroughly. The old had gone. The new had a free field.
Residues of the old social order remained, of course. These
existed more generally in the villages than anywhere else. The
peasants retained their agricultural and craft techniques, their
10

folkways, their social attitudes, their respect and contempt for
authority. Although the superstructure of both the Tzarist church
and state had disappeared, the peasants still respected the symbols
of both instItutions. T~s, the chairman of a peasant committee,
sent from his village to Moscow, reported the marvels he had
witnessed and ended, ((Last of all I saw Tzar Lenin himself. God
bless him!"
Other elements of the old order still persisted. Middle class
and upper class individuals were passively or actively anti-bolshe~
vik. Much of the church apparatus was intact and anti-revoln
tionary. Large numbers of Russians had gone abroad at the time
of the Revolution, hoping for foreign aid in the re-establishment
of their privileges. These and other factors laid the foundacions
for a potent counter-revolution.
Counter-revolutionary efforts against the Bolshevik regime took
several forms. First there was the civil war, accompanied by military invasion from Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany and
Poland. Czech troops participated in the counter-revolutionary
struggle. Then came the era of encirclement by armed state capitalism. Japan on the east and Germany and Italy on the west built up
powerful military machines, and in the Anti -Comintern Pact made
what amounted to a joint plan for destroying the Bolshevik regime.
Between 1932 and 1941 Great Britain and the United States joined
the anti-Comintern bloc in their war on the republics. The immediate occasion for this counter-revolutionary move was the worldwide economic breakdown that began in 1929 and the Spanish
Revolution of 1931. Within six years all of the European republics
except Switzerland had been either destroyed or neutralized. Then
came Munich (1938) with its program for the liquidation of the
Soviet Union.
Bolshevism survived all of these attacks. The Soviet regime in
Russia, like the Sovi,et regime in China, persisted. Unlike the
Soviet Regime in China, however, the Bolsheviks succeeded in
maintaining their control of the entire social apparatus. From this
vantage point they were able to carryon planned socialist construction.
From the day the Bolsheviks took power down to the present
moment there have never been two periods when the Soviet Union
II

was exactly the same. All social life changes; and social life in
the Soviet Union has changed with unusual rapidity through the
entire course of its existence. It is therefore impossible to give a
description of the Soviet Union at any particular stage in its evolution without knowing that before the description had been completed the thing described will have been modified in some degree.
Perhaps the most satisfactory way to characterize the Soviet Union
is to set down some of the immediate achievements of the revolution, some of the early efforts at social construction and then to
list some of the factors that distinguish present-day Soviet society
from the social systems existing in other parts of the world.
Peace, abundance and freedom were the slogans under which
the Bolsheviks took power. As followers of Marxian theory, their
first task was to end exploitation in the Soviet Union and to assist
in terminating exploitation in other parts of the world. John
Reed, in his Ten Days that Shook the World} gives a well-documented picture of this stage in Soviet history. Land, productive
tools, buildings and utilities were declared social property. Some
of them were held by the cooperatives, some by municipalities and
other local government agencies and some by the central government. The means of exploitation-the ownership of jobs, were
thus transferred from private to public control. A line of distinction was drawn between those forms of property which the individual used to satisfy his own needs, and those forms through
which the owner could compel others to do his bidding. Hand
tools and implements, small dwellings and personal belongings
remained private property. All other property became public.
Bolshevik control of Russian life had been secured under the
slogan (tAll power to the Soviets". The Soviets were bodies of
delegates elected by farmers, workers and soldiers. In the early
stages, farmers elected representatives from their villages, workers
from their factories and soldiers from their military formations.
As the soviet system developed, each village, town and city had its
village, town and city councilor soviet. There were regional
soviets, corresponding to state legislatures in the United States.
Republics such as the Ukraine and White Russia had their allrepublic soviets. Over all was the All-Union Soviet, a central parliament composed of representatives from the entire Soviet Union.
12

!zarist . Russia had restricted or suppressed mass organization.
With the revolution such organizations blossomed in wide variety. The country went organization-crazy.
Since the Bolsheviks held their authority as a result of mass
support, they began the organization of a society in terms, of these
mass interests. The peasants secured the use of the land. The
workers took control of productive enterprises. Public authorities
began the organization of schools, health services, recreation facilities. The Soviet Union was to be a country of, by and for the
masses.
Although Soviet leaders had promised peace to their followers,
immediately after the Revolution they found themselves in a civil
war against a score of counter-revolutionary armies, with invading
forces moving in from east and west. One of the first tasks of the
new government was therefore the establishment of the Red Army.
Throughout the entire course of Soviet history the Red Army has
received a large share of the national income, has been accorded a
high place among Soviet institutions and has played an important
role in shaping Soviet policy. The threat of war and the Axis. invasion in 1941 made the Red Army the focal Soviet organization.
Soviet leaders realized the necessity of unifying the population
over whom they exercised authority. In order to achieve this result
they proposed to abolish all forms of discrimination against races
and nationalities; to organize a federation of socialist soviet republics, each of which should enjoy a large measure of autonomy; to place men and women on the same political, social and
economic basis; to make rural economy as efficient as urban economy and thus to end the distinction between the backward country
and the advanced city; to raise the cultural level of the more backward areas of the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible to the level
of the more advanced areas. All of these provisions were aimed at
one general obj ect: the ending of inequality and the establishment
of equal opportunity fo~ the rising generation of Soviet citizens.
Class-divided society, argued the Bolshevik leaders, is torn by
schisms and conflicts. In the Soviet Union we shall set up a monolithic, class-free community in which the interests of all and the
interests of each are synonymous. Civil strife will cease, the Soviet
government will be the spokesman for the common and unified
13

aim of the community, which is the elevation of public well-being.
Monolithic society, freed from tensions by the abolition of class
divisions, would not be torn by rival interests speaking through
competing social groups and political parties. In the new society
one political party would exist, the party of the workers. Into this
party would be drawn a membership composed of the militant
vanguard of farmers, industrial workers, technical workers, professional w-orkers. Entrance into the party would be preceded by a
long and arduous probation. Those who succeeded in gaining admission would work selflessly for the well-being of the whole
Soviet people. Those members who failed to live up to their party
obligations would be ruthlessly purged from the party ranks.
A time would come when the work of socialist construction
would be completed and the new society had been organized. Then,
in the words of Frederick Engels, the strong socialist state would
«wither away". Such a development, however, lay in the future. It
was an ideal toward which Soviet society might look forward. For
the present the state was a powerful instrument, vigilantly safeguarding the interests of Soviet citizens.
Such were the general objectives of Soviet policy. They will be
found in the writings and speeches of Lenin and his co-workers.
They took form in the discussions and resolutions of the Russian
Communist Party. Attempts were made to give them institutional
reality in the developing life of the new society.
Counter-revolutionary forces and the inertia inherent in every
social group rendered the fulfillment of such objectives difficult or
impossible. In the economic field, for example, one of the first
moves of the Soviet Government was to socialize the means of
production and to establish a wide range of economic social services grouped under the general title of war communism. Within
three years, however, the Soviet Union officially inaugurated a
New Economic Policy which involved the granting of concessions
to foreign investors and the restoration of private merchandising
and some jobbing and manufacturing. Lenin recognized the move
as a retreat from war communism but described it as a step backward in preparation for two steps forward. Similar changes were
made in other fields. The high-water mark of the revolution was
reached in the months and years immediately following November
1917. Thereafter adjustments and compromises were made with
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the counter-revolutionary forces both inside and outside the Soviet
Union. A temporary advance was registered in the collectivization
of farmland that accompanied the first Five Year Plan (1928).
For the most part, however, the years from 192 I to 1941 witnessed
the adaptation of Soviet institutions to the psychology of a population trained under Tzarism and to a world scene in which the
Soviet Union and its institutions were anathema to virtually every
ruling class group.
So much for the internal life of the Soviet Union. Equally important in the eyes of Soviet leaders and of great numbers of
Soviet workers was the relation between the Soviet Union and the
outside world. The Russian Revolution was but one expression of
a general revolutionary wave. If the Russian workers could overthrow their exploiters and set up a socialist republic, why could
not the workers in Germany, France, Great Britain, the United
States, Mexico, China and Japan do the same thing? The achievement of this world revolution would be followed by the establishment of a world federation of peoples' republics. Empires would
be a thing Qf the past. Wars v/ould cease. The peoples Qf the
world, united in Qne great commonwealth, WQuid live in peace and
friendship. The age-Qld cQnflict Qf man against man WQuid be
forgotten in the period of universal brotherhQod.
The WQrld revolution did not materialize, however. By 1922,
when the Fascists seized PQwer in Italy, it was evident that world
cQunter-revQlutiQn was far more likely than world revolution.
Hence the gradual adaptatiQn Qf SQviet diplomacy and SQviet fQreign policy to' a world directed by the principles Qf power politics
and dQminated by half-a-dozen well-armed empires.
More than a quarter of a century has passed since the Soviet
Union adQpted its ambitious prQgram fQr a socialized Russia and
a sQcialized, federated WQrld. What remains Qf these plans? In the
world at large, Qutside Qf SQviet China, little Qr nothing, except
insofar as the existing anti -SQviet sQcial Qrder has taken Qver
segments Qf Soviet thinking and QrganizatiQn. Social planning is
now generally accepted as a functiQn Qf government. Managed
. eCQnomies are taken fQr granted. The WQrld at large, however, is
still either nQn-socialist Qr anti-socialist.
Inside the Soviet UniQn, while the mortality Qf early Soviet in-
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stitutions has been comparatively high, and while modifications in
Soviet thinking have been numerous and profound, Soviet society
has retained a phenomenally large proportion of the innovations
which it inaugurated immediately after the revolution. Social ownership of the means of production has been retained and enlarged
as the basis of Soviet economy. Social planning has been carried
to a high state of proficiency. Racial minorities have been federated,
their position has been respected, and despite their long tradition
of friction and conflict under Tzarism, they have worked together
with remarkable effectiveness. The one-party state has continued.
Control within the party has been more highly centralized. The
local autonomy of members of the Soviet Federation has been
decreased. Opposition was liquidated in the drastic purges of
1936-38. Nevertheless, the test imposed by the Nazi invasion of
1941 showed the Russian people solidly behind their leadership.
Soviet foreign policy, as we shall see in the course of these
discussions, no longer anticipates world revolution as an immediate probability. On the contrary, Soviet diplomats recognize
their position as a socialist minoritr in an imperialist world.
When Eric Johnston, President of. the United States Chamber of
Commerce, returned from an extensive inspection trip of Russia
in the summer of 1944, he wrote a series of signed newspaper
articles summing up his observations. ttThe Soviet's life is based
upon the State's ownership of all the means of production....
There is absolutely no evidence that the Soviet Union intends to
abandon, even in the smallest degree, this principle of the State's
ownership of all .the means of production. In fact, the people's
devotion to this system has been strengthened by the successes of
war.... The older, top-ranking Communist leaders installed this
system of collectivism twenty-seven year ago. They believed it saved
Russia from German enslavement. These older leaders are not
going to change the system. The directors of factories and farms
are men in their thirties. They know no other system for comparison ... : Today, not even telescopic or X-ray vision could see
any private enterprise clothing in the Russian Bear's wardrobe."
(N, Y. Times, July 30, 1944.)
Granted the correctness of Mr. Johnston's contention, and in the
article he goes on to 'argue that the Russian rank and file support
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their leaders in this position, it is evident that the revolution has
brought benefits that make it appear superior to Tzarism. What
are some of those benefits?
1. A people, living in the dark, has been enlightened. An illiterate famine-ridden exploited community, saturated with superstition, has been replaced by a literate, scientifically-minded generation, convinced that it can playa major role in shaping its own
destiny and in modifying the destiny of the entire human race.
2. A technically backward cOlnmunity has been converted, within one generation, into one of the most technically advanced areas
in the world. This transformation has been effected as a result of
social plans which the masses helped to make and to carry out.
The collectivization and mechanization of agriculture is one of the
most important aspects of this technological revolution.
3. A widely-Bung nation, consisting largely of farmers scattered
in some three hundred thousand villages and enjoying few social
services beyond those grudgingly rendered by a poorly served ecclesiastical apparatus, has come into possession of an elaborate
social security and social service organization including public
health, public education, public recreation, multiple social insurance, electrification, postal service, roads.
4. Industrialization, technical improvements, the broadening of
scientific activity, the encouragement of the arts and the growth
of the social services have created an unprecedented demand for
trained personnel. Consequently, within a decade after the revolution the Soviet Union was turning out tens of thousands of trained
men and women who were learning and following a wide variety
of technical and professional careers. In the language of the capitalist world, the revolution greatly expanded the Russian middle
class. In Soviet language, the revolution created a mass technological intelligentsia.
5. Socialistic construction offered energetic, ambitious boys and
girls of the new generation an opportunity to make a career for
themselves in the professions of their choice. Youth responded, as
young people anywhere respond under similar circumstances,
crowding into the schools, activating organizations, pouring time,
energy and enthusiasm into the multi pIe channels opened to them
by the revolution. Eric Johnston noted that the managers of Soviet
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enterprises are generally in their thirties. They are men and
women born around 1910, trained during or since the revolution,
who today compose the immense staff of technical experts that
directs the Soviet social apparatus.
6. Soviet youth has not worked for Russia alone. It has been
trained to believe that socialist construction gains in the Soviet
Union are gains for mankind. Events have demonstrated the correctness of this view. Successes achieved in many branches of
Soviet endeavor have made the Soviet Union a pioneer and leader
in world cultural advance ..The Soviet Union is pioneering on the
social frontier and its achievements have already modified human
society. Individually and collectively the Soviet people have a
record of which they may be justly proud and look forward into
a future which they are actively helping to shape.
7. Tzarism confined opportunity to a relatively small group at
the apex of the social pyramid. In accordance with feudal tradition, the top leaders were generally born to authority, whether
they were capable of exercising it or not. The revolution opened
the gates of opportunity to the masses, and through them Hooded
a great wave of popular enthusiasm to know, to plan, to build
and create.
There was a type pattern of social organization existing
throughout the western world in the 19th century. We have been
calling it the Victorian pattern. It included such traditional institutions as private property, class division, capitalist exploitation,
parliamentary government, imperialism and military conHict.
During the past fifty years .the Victorian pattern has been pulverized as -the result of economic breakdown, war, colonial revolt
and social revolution. Discovery and invention have played a
basic part in expediting this process. Out of the disorder and
chaos attendant upon the destruction of the old social order, a
new social form is emerging. The Russian Revolution was the
dramatic highlight in ·this social change and the Soviet Union has
become the pioneer of the new social order.
Through the 18th century, when feudal society was being replaced by a business-dominated world, the English colonies in
North America, the business elements in France and the ruling
classes of Britain and Holland built up the system of free enter18

prise in economics and of representative parliamentary government
in politics which became the type pattern of the more progressive
parts of the 19th century world. There seems every reason to believe that the institutional changes that followed the Russian Revolution may be playing a similar part in establishing the social type
pattern of the 20th century.
The Soviet Union is a large, complex and rapidly changing
community, about which it is difficult to generalize with any degree
of accuracy. I have tried to describe some of the changes that have
taken place since Tzarism was replaced by Sovietism and to indicate
the effects that these changes have had upon the life of the
Russian people. This analysis is of necessity superficial, inadequate
and sadly lacking in the kind of detail necessary to any complete
picture. But it helps to clothe the term ttSoviet Union" with a
reality that lies beyond the realm of prejudice and that is making
it possible for the peoples of Russia to playa major role in world
affairs.

II. THE 5 0 V lET U N ION
BECON\ES A WORLD POWER

Tzarist Russia was a world power. There could be no two opinions on that subject. The country had a large area and a considerable population. Foreign governments sent ambassadors to the
Court of St. Petersburg. Russian diplomats were sought out and
consulted. The Russian Foreign Office was one of the busiest in
Europe. Textbooks listed Russia among the seven or eight leading
powers.
With the fall of the Tzar went the prestige that had attached to
the Russian Court and had attended the representatives of the
Russian state. The Tzar was dead, the Court was dissolved. Those
who had spoken for Russia in the name of His Imperial Majesty
were scattered far and wide. The guiding spirits in the Bolshevik
state had been gathered from the prison camps of Siberia, the jails
of Russia, and from humble living quarters in foreign cities. They
spoke in the name of wage-earners, farmers, soldiers and professional workers. Could a state led by such a motley collection of
nobodies become a great world power?
Before a specific answer can be given to that question it will be
necessary to come to some understanding as to the meaning of
political power. We speak of The Powers, with a capital P, and
refer to a particular nation or empire as a Great Power or a World
Power. What do these terms imply?
Until comparatively recent years it was customary to describe
power rather than to define it. There was no question in anyone's
mind but that Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia were all
great powers before 1917. Why were they great powers? Psychologists, analysing power in human relationships, describe it as the
possibility of imposing the will of one person upon another person.
Sociologists define power as the possibility of compelling others
to subordinate their interests to the interests of those in authority.
The man in the street would say that power implies the possibility
of pushing somebody else around. Translate these ideas into the
realm of international politics and power signifies the capacity of
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the power-holder to impose its will upon those nations, peoples or
individuals over whom it desires to exercise authority.
Political scientists are pretty well agreed as to the practical
meaning of power. Frederick L. Schuman, for example, begins his
International Politics: ttForce, fraud and favors are the weapons
of power which rulers have used from the beginning of recorded
time to induce obedience from the ruled." (2nd Ed., p. I.) N. J.
Spykman explains international power relations by pointing out
that international society, as at present constituted, is ttwithout a
central authority to preserve law and order, and without an official
agency to protect its members in the enj oyment of their rights."
(America's Strategy in World Politics, p. 7') * Consequently, ttthe
basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation
of territorial integrity and political independence." (Ibid.) p. 17.)
Under such circumstances, ttThe struggle for power is identical
with the struggle for survival, and the improvement of the relative
power position becomes the primary objective of the internal and
the external policy of states .... Power means survival, the ability
to impose one's will on others, the capacity to dictate to those who
are without power.... The search for power is not made for the
achievement of moral values. Moral values are used to facilitate
the attainment of power." (Ibid.) p. 18.) What is the ultimate
test of power? Professor Spykman answers: ttPower is, in the last
instance, the ability to wage successful war." (Ibid.) p. 4I.)
Such definitions make world politics and power politics synonymous terms. In the absence of world government, sovereign states
in the pursuit of their special interests take whatever steps are
necessary to ensure their survival and to extend their control over
additional territory and larger numbers of people. ttpolitics has
ever been a game wherein the contestants have vied with one another for the tools of authority." (Schuman, as above, p. I.) What
are the tools of authority? What are the elements of world power?
For the purpose of our discussion we shall list six factors and
describe them as the essential ingredients of political power: (I)
geographical advantage; (2) productivity; (3) man power; (4)
leadership, management and direction; (5) a military apparatus,

* Quotations by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.,
publishers.
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and (6) the unity, solidarity and morale of the community. Any
nation or people in possession of these six power ingredients is a
world power, irrespective of historic background or contemporary
world opinion.
If historic background or contemporary world opinion were the
determining factor in world power, Tzarist Russia still would be
classed as a world power. If world-wide disapproval, opposition,
hatred and ostracism were determining factors in preventing a
nation or people from becoming a world power, the Soviet Union
could never have hoped for inclusion among the leading nations.
In short, world power is a question not of prejudice or opinion
but of fact. In examining the position of the Soviet Union as a
world power, neither opinion nor prejudice play any significant
role. Either the Soviet Union possesses the essential ingredients of
power and must therefore be included in any consideration of
world powers, or else, lacking these ingredients it must be content
to rank among the minor factors in international affairs.
Geographically the Soviet Union occupies an unusually advantageous position. Its territory stretches from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, occupying contiguous portions of northern Europe and
northern Asia. During the last five centuries all of the great world
powers have been located in the North Temperate Zone. There
is some difference of opinion as to the reason, but one geographical
factor is obvious, the bulk of the world land masses lies in the
North Temperate Zone, and the bulk of the world's population
lives there. Any nation occupying eight million square miles of
contiguous territory in the North Temperate Zone would be in a
strategically desirable power position.
Before the development of electricity as a source of light and
industrial energy, Russia lay rather far to the north. Winters were
severe; days were shorter, and the possibilities of production and
transport were sharply limited by the seasons. One of the first
measures taken by the Bolshevik Government called for the establishment of an electric grid covering the entire Soviet Union. Even
during the war years, construction on this grid has continued.
Soviet territory lies so far to the north that the problem of icefree ports is a matter of major importance. Russian foreign policy
long has been colored by the necessity for warm-water outlets.
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The problem remains, but with the growth of railroading, roadtrucking and aviation it has become less essential than it was in
the days when most transportation and travel were water-borne.
European national territories were carved out for the most part
in an era of sailing ships and horse-drawn land traffic. These factors explain at least in part the relatively equal areas of the principal west European nations. The continental dimensions of the
Soviet Union rendered efficient administration difficult or impossible before the introduction of rail, auto and air transport, telephone, telegraph and radio. Since these technical advances were
made, continental areas like those included in the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. can be administered more easily from one central point
than could the much smaller nations of West Europe be administered in the middle of the last century.
Fertility is no less important than the location and extent of a geographic area. The term includes soil productivity, timber growth
and the presence of metals and fuels. In all of these respects the
Soviet Union is unusually fortunate. Some of the most productive
land in the world is included within its borders. In climatic range
the country extends from the Arctic to the sub-tropics. The Soviet
Union contains the largest timber reserves of any country in the
world. The quantity and variety of its metals and fuels have not
yet been determined, but the geological surveys undertaken and
the mining enterprises launched during the last two decades make
it certain that, with the possible exception of the United States,
no nation has within its hDme territory a greater quantity Dr
variety Df the metals or fuels essential to' modern industry.
One considerable school of thought has, in recent years, laid
great stress upon the role Df geography as an ingredient of power.
The argument may have been somewhat overdrawn by the geopolitical school, but there can be no difference of Dpinion about
the assertion that geographical factors are of great consequence
as power determinants. In terms of geography the Soviet Union
occupies a position that has no parallel outside of North America.
If China or western Europe were unified, politically and socially,
they would have to be included in this listing of advantageous
ge~graphic positions. As matters stand today, however U.S.A. and
LJ S.S.R. hold the two choicest geographic bases for political power.
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The second ingredient of political power is productivity. Fertile
soil and mineral deposits are ineffective in power terms unless
they can be converted intO' producer and consumer goods. It is a
truism that North America, under the Red Men, was less productive than under the White Men. The difference was not in
fertility but in utilization.
Under the Tzars, Russian fertility was only partially utilized.
Much of its mineral wealth was not even suspected. Quantities of
timber and farm products were exchanged in the raw for manufactured imports. The Soviet regime has multiplied Russian
productivity by greatly extending the utilization of its natural
resources, improving its agricultural technique and building an
extensive industrial plant.
Soviet economy has passed through fO'ur notable stages. The
first, extending from 1917 to 1922, included the period of the
revolution and the civil wars which followed it. Soviet productivity in 1922 was probably about one-fifth that of 1913. In
certain fields, such as railroading and mining, production was
virtually at a standstill. The second stage was one of recovery,
lasting O'ver five years. In 1927 the level of productivity in the
Soviet Union was roughly that of Tzarist Russia in 1913. The
third period of Soviet economy covered a decade, from the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan in 1928 to the Munich Conference ten years later. The fourth period was a period of YVar
economy that began in 1939, when Soviet leadership definitely
was preparing for participation in World War II.
Soviet authorities have compiled figures of national income
which express this development in the following form:
RUSSIAN NATIONAL INCOME
IN 1926-7 PRICES
(in billions of rubles)
1913.................................................................................
1925.................................................................................
1929.................................................................................
1938.................................................................................

21.0
16.8
28.9
105.0

The second year of the Five Year Plan found Soviet income
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well above that of Tzarist pre-war Russia. During the next ten
years the national income increased more than three-fold.
Soviet income inceased rapidly after 1928 because that year
witnessed the beginning of planned production. Various tentative
plans had been tried out during the previous decade. Most of
them were limited to particular economic fields, such as electrification, and all of them were tentative gropings after a technique
that would permit the coordination of an entire national economy.
The First Five Year Plan paralleled the collectivization of agriculture. After its inauguration the whole of Soviet economy
moved ahead under the direction of local, regional and central
planning authorities. The League of Nations Statistical Year
Book publishes a table of index numbers covering general industrial production, and arranged by countries. The figures are based
upon 1929 as 100 and cover exactly a decade. They were so significant that I should like to refer to them in some detail.
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX
Germany Great Britain
1929........................
1932 ........................
1935 ........................
1938 ........................

100
53
94
126

100
84
106
116

U.S.A.
100
54
76
72

Soviet Union
100
183
293
470

Comparable figures are given for four countries in order to emphasize the contrast between Soviet economic trends and the trends
in countries that were still relying upon unplanned economy.
Perhaps it is merely a coincidence, but the Soviet Five Year Plan
was launched in the height of bourgeois prosperity in the 1920s.
Years before, Lenin had raised the question: who will outdistance
whom? Bourgeois economy had sought stabilization in terms of
its pre-war status. Soviet economy represented the achievements of
socialist construction based upon an over-all social plan. Industrial production in Germany, Great Britain and the United States
passed from a high point in 1929 to a low one in 1932. Thereafter, it advanced in Germany and Great Britain with the maturing armaments race. Arms production did not make its influence
felt in United States economy until 1939.
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Two facts regarding Soviet economy are particularly noteworthy
in the above table. First, Soviet productivity increased every year
from 1929 to 1938. In other words, Soviet production, unlike
that of every other industrialized area was not affected by the worldwide depression. The second noteworthy fact is the rapidity with
which Soviet economy developed. The League Year Book breaks
down the production figures for the leading nations into consumer
goods, producer goods and machinery. From 1929 to 1936 consumer goods production in the Soviet Union rose 1"86%; producer
goods, 386%; machine production, 826%. Unfortunately for this
comparison, Soviet figures for 1937 and 1938 were not available
when the League publication went to print.
The First Five Year Plan was launched with the avowed intention of converting the Soviet Union from a country depending upon
imports of manufactured goods to a country manufacturing for
its domestic market. .In order to achieve this result it was necessary
to construct machines, open mines, build factories, expand road
and railroad facilities. The success of this program between 1928
and 1936 is indicated by the figures just cited.
When the Soviet government was established, Russia was a
predominantly agricultural country. Although some industries had
been developed, Tzarist Russia did not rank as a producer of manufactured goods. Under the drive of socialist construction the
Soviet Union became one of the three or four most important
manufacturing centres in the world. Pig iron is the principal metal
of modern industry. World production stood at 99 million tons in
19 29; at 49 million tons in 1933; and at 104 million tons in
1937. Soviet production of pig iron for the same three years was
4 million tons; 7 million tons, and 17 million tons. Coal is the
principal fuel of modern industry. World production was 1,333
million tons in 1929; 1,008 million tons in 1933, and 1,307 million tons in 1937. Soviet production of coal for the same three years
was 42 million tons; 76 million tons; 123 million tons. While
world iron and coal production dipped through the depression
and reached pre-depression levels by 1937, Soviet iron and coal
production multiplied three times. The Soviet Union was moving
with giant strides in its efforts to overtake and surpass industrial
production in the capitalist world.
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Iron and coal were major factors in 19th century industry, and
they are major factors today. The use of electricity, on the other
hand, is a relatively modern industrial development. It is noteworthy that in 1938, the last year before the outbreak of World
War II, the production of electric energy in millions of kilowatt
hours was: U.S.A. 116,890; Germany 55,238; U.S.S.R. 38,000
The fourth country in terms of electric production was Great
Britain, with 30,700. In 1929, Canada, Japan, France, and Italy
all exceeded the Soviet Union in the production of electricity.
Soviet production was more than six times as great in 1938 as it
was in 1929, making the Soviet Union the third largest producer
in the world.
When the Soviet leaders took over the broken remnants of Tzarist society they faced two major tasks. One was to get Russia back
to the productive levels of 1913. The other was to industrialize
the Soviet Union. The former task was completed by 1927. Ten
years later the Soviet Union occupied a position among the three
or four most important industrial producing nations of the world.
The third factor which we listed as among the six essential
ingredients of political power, was man power. No state apparatus
can function unless it has an adequate supply of men and women
trained and willing to carry on the necessary social activities. The
great powers of Europe, outside Russia, have populations running
from 42 million in France, 43 million in Italy, 47 million in Great
Britain to 65 million in Germany. The population of Japan is 72
million; of the United States 130 million. The population of the
Soviet Union is 170 million. All of these figures are for 1937 and
1938. Among the great powers of the world the Soviet Union
ranks first in the numbers of its home population. Quantity without
quality is meaningless, however, and in terms of political power,
quality means capacity to produce, organize, administer, defend.
Tzarist Russia had a large population, but the bulk of them were
farmers who depended upon human energy and a little animal
power. Four-fifths of these farmers could neither read nor write.
One of the first tasks confronted by Soviet leaders was that of
developing a trained personnel. Something has already been said
in our discussion of the Russian Revolution concerning the revolution in Russian education that accompanied the shift in political
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power. Under the Tzars, about seven million children were in
school. Twenty years later, the total was about 33 million. If time
permitted, a great deal might be said about the course of study
under the two regimes. Tzarist schools were mainly church controlled. They deliberately avoided technical education. Soviet
schools were organized to turn out a group of boys and girls capable
of carrying on the necessary work of a modern industrial community.
The Soviet Union did not limit its educational endeavors to
youngsters. It carried through a remarkably successful campaign
to teach the whole adult population reading and writing. Twenty
years after the revolution, when some 30 million children were
enrolled in classes, the number of adults similarly enrolled was
placed at 50 millions. Unfortunately, there is no time to pursue
this subject further. It may be summed up in a sentence: the Soviet
Union undertook the task of educating and retraining an entire
population. Its success is measurea at least in part by the remarkable
strides made in the various departments of Soviet life.
Fourth among the essential ingredients of political power we
listed leadership, management, and direction. Tzarism broke down
because its leadership was unable to direct public affairs under the
stress of total war. Soviet leadership faced the tasks of the revolution, of the liquidation of the old regime, of the rehabilitation of
a disorganized society, and of the planning and construction of a
socialist community. In all of these directions it successfully met
the three tests of leadership: (I) it was able to survive; (2) it
was able to command community support; (3) it was able to meet
a changing social scene and to adapt itself to new social situations
as they arose.
There are periods in history when leadership survival depends
upon ability to defend and preserve the status quo, but a high
tempo of social change requires of leadership adaptability rather
than capacity to conserve. From I9I7 to I927 Soviet leadership
faced revolutionary change. During the next decade its primary
task was that of adjusting itself to survival in an imperialist world.
Soviet leadership during the first period was in the main revolutionary; during the second period it fell back upon compromise
and formulas of political expediency. The leadership mortality
involved in this changing outlook was relatively high but the
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Soviet people proved themselves equal to the task of providing a
leader group for each of these sharply divergent tasks.
Munich presented Soviet leadership with a third problem:
preparation for total war. Again there were replacements. Again
Soviet leadership proved itself capable of waging total war and
of surviving.
Survival in total war, which is the final test of political power,
depends upon the effectiveness of the war-making apparatus. It is
obviously impossible to give facts and figures concerning Soviet
military prep~rations. This much is known, however. Between
I94I and I945 the armed forces of the Soviet Union met and
mastered a military organization that by common consent was one
of the best organized and equipped. Furthermore, behind Nazi
militarism in I94I was the productive capacity not only of a highly
industrialized Germany, but in addition, of Austrian, Czech, Belgian, French, Polish, Dutch and other industrialized European
territories. Ten years earlier it would probably have been impossible for the Soviet Union to meet such an onslaught. The crucial
years following the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan provided the country with the machine equipment needed to supply
its armed forces and to maintain the working capacity of its civilian
population.
Finally, among the essential ingredients of political power, is
the unity, solidarity and stamina of a nation or people. Russia
had never been a highly coordinated empire. On the contrary,
regional and racial tensions and conflicts were accentuated and
utilized by the Tzarist burocracy in accordance with the widely
adopted formula: divide and rule. The years immediately after
the Russian Revolution witnessed an ambitious effort to weld together into a working organization the heterogenous economic,
racial, nationalistic, linguistic and religious elements that had lived
in uneasy propinquity under Tzarism. The problem of making this
adjustment was referred to in terms of racial and national minorities. Something has already been said about the success attending
two decades of Soviet minorities policy. It was common talk in the
imperial capitals that an invasion of Russia would split the country
wide open, with Ukrainians, White Russians and other suppressed
nationalities taking the opportunity to strike back at their Great
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Russian oppressors. The German General Staff undoubtedly based
its strategy upon such a pre-supposition. No such divisions occurred.
Instead, the Soviet people displayed so phenomenal a sense of
solidarity that, under the pressure of military defeat and even of
military occupation, there were few defections. The invaders were
able to secure as collaborationists no Russian leaders of consequence. The Moscow regime commanded the almost unanimous
support of the Soviet population.
Such a test of national solidarity comes rarely-perhaps once
in a generation. The Soviet Union met the test and survived it more
successfully perhaps than any other invaded nation of Europe.
We have examined the six essential ingredients of political
power,-geographical advantage, productivity, man power, leadership and direction, military effectiveness, and group solidarity,-as
they are represented in the life of the Soviet Union. If these are
the essentials of world power, then certainly the Soviet Union is
a world power, because in these essential respects the Soviet Union
stands well at the forefront among modern nations. In theory at
least, and in the terms ordinarily employed by the student of
politics, the Soviet Union occupies a prominent position in the top
power group.
So much for our theoretical analysis. Now let us turn our attention to matters of power politics. Power politicians do not bargain
and threaten in terms of theory. They recognize and respect
strength as readily as they take advantage of weakness.
Revolution weakens the power position of any community in
which it occurs. For one thing, revolution involves a change in
leadership. Again, it means institutional transformations. Any such
rapid alternations in the social set-up lead not only to confusion
but invite disruption of which the counter-revolutionary forces are
the first to take advantage. The Russian Revolution proved no exception to this rule of history. Changes of leadership, institutional
shifts, and counter-revolutionary drives were so effective in weakening the Soviet State that the Germans had no difficulty in imposing a victor's peace at Brest-Litovsk and the Poles and Roumanians,
with the backing of the western empires, were able to deprive the
Soviet Union of vital territory. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all parts of the Tzarist empire, became independent nations

30

and, with Poland and Czechoslovakia, constituted the cordon sanitaire that separated western Europe from the ((Bolshevik Menace" .
Thus, in the first four years of its existence, the Soviet State not
only suffered military defeat, but was forced to surrender territory
that had been a part of the Tzarist empire.
With the exception of protests from labor bodies like the British
Trade Union Congress these attacks against the Soviet Union were
carried on with impunity. Soviet Russia was an outcast nation. It
was I924 before Great Britain recognized the Soviet regime.
France, Italy and Japan followed suit. Sixteen years passed before
the United States recognized the U.S.S.R. As lately as the Munich
encirclement of I938 it was taken for granted that a coalition of the
great powers could liquidate the Soviet Union as they had disposed
of the Spanish and Czech Republics during the two preceding
years. Count Ciano records in his diary a remark of the German
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on June I6, I94I: ttIf we attack them,
the Russia of Stalin will be erased within eight weeks." (N. Y.
Times 6/I8/45)
From I922 to "I94I the Soviet Union tested out its economic and
social attitudes, relationships and institutions. Rapid and drastic
modifications were made in many directions. Particularly after the
launching of the Firsf Five Year Plan, Soviet leadership, sure of
its course, began large-scale industrialization as a preliminary to
making the country relatively independent of the capitalist world.
Speaking in Moscow before a meeting to celebrate the October
Revolution, V. M. Molotov said: ttThe capitalist world has recently
been obliged to yield a little and retreat, while the Soviet Union ...
has grown in dimensions and increased its population ... We must
not forget, of course, that nine-tenths of the human race are still
living within the framework of capitalist society, under the rule
of capitalism.
.
"The Soviet Union comprises less than one-tenth of the population of the globe ... Comparison between the paths of development
of the capitalist countries and of the Soviet Union speak against
the capitalist world and not for it." (Text of TASS dispatch N. Y.
Times I2/7/39)
It was at this time that Molotov and other Soviet spokesmen
began to refer to the Soviet Union as eta great world power". The
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reference was not taken seriously, however, in the imperialist capitals. So relatively unimportant did the Soviet Union seem as a
factor in world politics that when Prime Minister Churchill and
President Roosevelt held their Atlantic Conference in August
1941 the Soviet Union was ignore.d. The Anglo-American leaders
decided, in effect, that they would organize and police the postwar world, and in proof of their intentions they signed and published the Atlantic Charter, setting forth in idealistic language an
Anglo-American formula for Anglo-American world domination.
Not only was the Soviet Union ignored, but Anglo-Saxon publicists accepted the Atlantic Charter as the consummation of a long
postponed unification of world-supreme forces. In the past, Britannia alone had ruled the waves. Combined with American productive capacity it seemed obvious that British sea-supremacy
would be able to direct world affairs.
After the publication of the Atlantic Charter, people talked
constantly about Anglo-American world policing. When I asked
them: <tDo you propose also to police the Soviet Union?" the
almost invariable answer was: <tOf course. Why not?"
The Soviet Union had been invaded on JU:le 22, 1941 by German armed forces. In August therefore when the Atlantic Conference was held, the Soviet Union was at war as a partner of the
British Empire. Had the Soviet Union been taken seriously it
would certainly have been invited to participate in the Conference
discussions. Although the United States did not enter World War
II until four months after the Atlantic Conference, it was the
United States and not the Soviet Union that joined with the British to make up the Big Two that drevv up the Atlantic Charter.
Soviet forces were engaging the great bulk of the Axis war
machine. Negotiations were already under way that resulted in
the Anglo-Soviet Twenty Year Treaty of May 1942. The Soviet
Union was not included because both London and Washington
were convinced that it could be ignored safely. Only the strong
were invited to conferences of big powers.
During the next two years the Soviet Union suffered a series
of military reverses, lost large areas of its most productive territory, and came within a hair's breadth of losing both Leningrad
and Moscow. The tide turned at Stalingrad. The Red Army had
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been reorganized and reequipped. The Nazis had extended their
lines and had struck their blow. Now it was the turn of the
Red Army.
A little more than two years after the Atlantic Conference
Marshal' Jan Smuts made a speech before the United Kingdom
Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association in the Houses of
Parliament, London, Nov. 25, 1943. (South African Government
Information Office text.) The speech was historic. General Smuts
was the first responsible statesman outside the Soviet Union to say
what Soviet leaders had been repeating since 1938: the Soviet
Union is a great world power.
General Smuts offered this analysis of the world situation: c eWe
have moved into a strange world, a world such as has not been
seen for hundreds of years, perhaps not for a thousand years.
Europe is completely changing. The old Europe which we have
known ... has gone. The map is being rolled up and a new map
is unrolling before us." General Smuts followed this statement
with a brief comment on the disappearance of "three of the five
great powers" of Europe: Fra.nce, Italy and Germany. "We are,
therefore, left with Great Britain and with Russia. Russia is the
new colossus in Europe, the new colossus that bestrides this continent. When we consider all that has happened to Russia within
the last twenty-five years, and we see Russia's inexplicable and
phenomenal rise, we can only call it one of the great phenomena
in history. It is the sort of thing to which there is no parallel in
history, but it has come about ... Russia is the new colossus on the
European continent. What the after-effects of that will be, nobody
can say. We can but recognize that this is a new fact to reckon
with, and we must reckon with it coldly and objectively. With the
others down and out, and herself the mistress of the continent,
her power will not only be great on that account, but it will be still
greater because the Japanese Empire will also have gone the way
of all flesh. Therefore any check or balance that might have arisen
in the East will have disappeared. You will have Russia in a position which no country has ever occupied in the history of Europe."
General Smuts then turned his attention to Great Britain and
the British Empire. "The purely European position of Great Britain will be one of enormous prestige and respect, and will carry
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enormous weight, but she will be poor." After mentioning (tthe
United States, the other great world power", General Smuts concluded (tIn that trinity you will have two powers of immense power
and resources-Russia and America-and you will have this island,
the heart of the Empire and of the Commonwealth, weak in her
European resources in comparison with the vast resources of the
other two."
While Marshal Smuts was speaking in London, Roosevelt,
Churchill and Stalin were meeting at Teheran. The brief communication, dated Dec. I, 1943, apprising the world of the conclusions
reached at this meeting was signed not by two but three names.
The Big Three had superseded the Big Two of Atlantic Conference
days. Little more than two years earlier, Roosevelt and Churchill
had felt confident that they could decide world issues without
the presence of a third party. Now the Soviet colossus, bestriding
the European continent, was included as a matter .of necessity.
This decision was not reache'd because of personal bias. Churchill's writings and speeches for a quarter of a century had marked
him as an inveterate enemy of Sovietism. Roosevelt's record in the
Spanish Civil War left no possible doubt as to his attitude. The
Anglo-American partnership was enlarged because the demonstrated capacity of the Soviet Union to look out for its own interests
and to playa prominent role in deciding the affairs of its neighbors
allowed no margin of choice.
Churchill and Roosevelt both said many flattering things about
the achievements of the Red Army in 1942 and 1943. It remained,
however, for Churchill to hit the nail on the head in his report to
Commons on August 2, 1944. (tThe Russian Army has done the
main work in tearing the guts out of the Germany Army". That
was the decisive factor. After the summer of 1941 more German
divisions were occupied on the Russian front than on all other
fields of operation combined. It was there that German resources
and manpower were most rapidly exhausted. It was there that
German military might was most effectively liquidated.
Facts are stubborn things. Nowhere are they more self-evident
than on the field of battle, which synthesizes and synchronizes all
of the ingredients of political power. If the capacity to wage successful war is the ultimate test of power, the Soviet Union had met
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and passed the test by the autumn of 1943. Henceforward, it must
be included as a major factor in world affairs. It became a matter
of course for a New York Times correspondent (1/9/45) to begin
a story dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean: ttWith Russia's
emergence as the greatest power on the European continent, many
dissident factions in other of the Middle-East countries are looking
for the first time to Moscow for encouragement in some of their
hopes."
The New York Times did not print this sentence because of any
pro-Soviet leanings. For a generation the paper, both in its editorial
and news columns had been an outstanding enemy of the Soviet
Union. It printed the sentence in the opening days of 1945 because
by that time no responsible European correspondent could ignore
the immense influence that the Soviet Union was exercising over
the lesser nations in its vicinity.
After a·decade of obscurity and impotence growing out of defeat
in World War I and the revolution with its accompanying civil
wars, the Bolshevik regime in 1928 launched an over-all plan for the building of socialism in one country. Due partly to its geographic position and partly to its effective development of social
and political organization, the Soviet Union has been able in the
past three or four years to meet and pass all of the essential power
tests. Today it is taken for granted, even among the bitterest reactionaries and the most hard-bitten defenders of capitalist imperialism, that the Soviet Union is a world power.
More than three-score nations make up what political scientists
call the Western State System. Any thorough consideration of the
part played by the Soviet Union in world affairs would have to
include some comment on Soviet relations with at least the most
influential of the world powers. Time forbids any such detailed
analysis. So we shall group our subject-matter under three main
headings asking: (I) what are Soviet relations with Europe; (2)
with Asia, and (3) with the United States. Those considerations
will lead us to our final topic: the probabilities of peace or war
for the Soviet Union.
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III. THE 5 0 V lET U N ION I N E U R 0 P E
Geographically, the Soviet Union in 1938 occupied about onehalf of Europe. Soviet population was about one-third of the
European total. Politically, as Marshal Smuts so very well said, the
Soviet Union has a position in Europe which no nation has held
in modern times. So much for the general picture. In considering
some of the detail, suppose we begin by noting the phenomenally
rapid shifts in political partnerships made by the Soviet Union
during the two decades that preceded 1941.
These two decades began with a series of European revolutions
that accompanied and followed W orId War I and reached their
high point in Russia. The Europe of 1921 was composed of three
strong victor nations-Britain, France and Italy; of one defeated
outcast nation-Germany, and of one nation-Russia, emerging
from revolution and civil war. In addition to these major European
powers there were a dozen minor powers in Scandinavia, the Low
Countries, the Iberian Peninsula and South Europe, all of which
had been in existence prior to 1914, and half-a-dozen synthetic
minor powers made up at Versailles out of territory formerly held
by Tzarist Russia, Germany and the dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Europe of 1921 was as unstable as a large
aggregation of wealth, population and power could well be. The
stablest part of the continent was in the west. Middle and eastern
Europe had suffered from political and social major surgery and it
seemed very doubtful whether the end of the process was yet in
sight.
Russia and Germany were the two outcasts in the European
family of nations. Russia was outcast because its government was
headed by avowed revolutionists. Germany was outcast because it
had suffered military defeat, and by official admission had assumed sole guilt for beginning World War I. Representatives of
these two nations met at Rapallo in 1922 and made a treaty which
constituted for both Russia and Germany a major diplomatic
victory. For Russia it meant diplomatic recognition by a first-class
European power. Germany, though officially guilty of the war, had
been diplomatically recognized by Russia.
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The Treaty of Rapallo thus strengthened the position of the two
weakest major states of Europe. It did something else. In 1922
Russia was a source of raw materials much needed in Germany.
Germany possessed a well-equipped industrial plant capable of
supplying the Soviet Union with the machine tools required for
socialist construction. Russia was able to offer Germany an opportunity to train military cadres on Russian soil. Germany, in
exchange, provided the Soviet Union with technical aid in establishing its arms industry.
There has been much speculation as to the exact nature of the
Russian-German relationships established at Rapallo, and of the
effect which they had on the development of the two countries during the next fourteen years. It is a fair guess that the diplomatic
and economic arrangements made at Rapallo were as significant as
any entered into by the Soviet Union between 1922 and 1936.
The decade following Rapallo was not a fruitful one in terms of
Soviet-European relations. Other nations were grudging and slow
in establishing trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union. Even after the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations,
in 1934, European governments generally looked askance at Moscow as the possible or probable source of international revolutionary agitation that might constitute a serious threat to the established
system of capitalist imperialism.
During 1934 and 1935 Soviet diplomats negotiated treaties with
France and Czechoslovakia. The French treaty was a mutual assistance pact. The Czech treaty provided that the Soviet Union
would come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if the French did so.
Both treaties were in theory the beginning of a multilateral mutual
assistance agreement that might be signed by any European nation
desiring to do so. The move was a part of the new Soviet diplomacy
of collective security. It was the answer of the Soviet Foreign
Office to the growing danger of military encirclement involved in
the Japanese occupation of Mancburia and in the rise of a fascistoriented Middle Europe) The Soviet-French-Czech pacts had another significant aspect. With the Spanish Republic, organized in
I932, Russia, France and Czechoslovakia stretched across the
European continent from north-east to south-west. Until the end
of the German Republic they constituted a continuous belt of pop37

ular or revolutionary governments, splitting the monarchies of
north-west Europe away from the monarchies of south-east Europe.
Two events of I936 had a profound effect upon Soviet relations with western Europe. The first was the speech made by
Chancellor Hitler at the Nazi Party Congress in Nuremburg. In the
cours'e of this address Hitler said that if Germany had the wheatfields of the Ukraine and the minerals of the Urals, the German
people could enjoy great enhancement of their prosperity. The
second was the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War with its line-up
of the Soviet Union on the side of the Spanish Republic and of
Italy, Germany, Britain and France on the side of the rebel generals.
I938 brought the virtual defeat of the Spanish Republic with
its consequent discomfiture for the Soviet Union, and the Munich
Conference engineered by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.
At this conference Chamberlain representing Britain, Daladier
representing France, Mussolini speaking for Italy, and Hitler for
Germany, reached certain agreements with regard to the Czech
Republic and the Soviet Republic. These agreements are not yet a
matter of public record. The fate of Czechoslovakia is history.
The Munich commitments, insofar as they referred to the Soviet
Union, are still a matter of conjecture. Circumstantial evidence
however, points strongly to the conclusion that the participants in
the Munich Conference agreed upon the liquidation of the Soviet
Republic. Ostensibly, Chamberlain was seeking peace. Actually, he
succeeded in establishing an alliance of the four major powers of
western Europe. Two of these powers were members of the Axis
combination. The Axis group had already signed and published
the Anti-Comintern Pact (November I936) and were thus publicly lined up in opposition to the Soviet Union. Hitler had openly
expressed the desire of the Nazis for the Soviet food and metals
(November I936). All four of the Munich powers had worked
closely together for two years in the effort to destroy the Spanish
Republic (I936-38). By implication, Japan, though not represented at Munich, was a part of the combination made there.
Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, was in close touch with
Germany and Italy, and since I93I had been threatening and
attacking the Soviet Union through Manchuria and Mongolia.
Munich, in effect, was a five power encirclement of the Soviet
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Union, directed by the British Prime Minister and designed to
liquidate the last of those European republics that had come into
being during the revolutionary decade that followed 1917. Except
for the United States, every major world power was thus definitely
aligned against Soviet Russia.
Munich meant something else beside a four or five power alliance, encircling the Soviet Union. It meant the complete collapse
of the collective security diplomacy which Litvinov had been championing in Geneva. The Soviet Foreign Office had asked for a
multilateral treaty of mutual assistance that would bind together
the principal powers of Europe in a policy of collective security
based on the enforcement of the League of Nations Covenant. The
answer of western Europe to this Soviet overture was the pact of
Munich.
Soviet diplomacy thus found itself defeated. The Soviet Union
was isolated and encircled. Could it break this iron ring of hostile
imperial enemies? Or must it accept the gauge of unequal battle
and fight a war against the vast power of this world-wide political
combination? The first and obvious step was an attempt to break
the iron ring. With this obj ect in mind, Soviet representatives
immediately began negotiations with Britain, France and Germany.
The negotiations with Britain and France dragged on through the
spring and early summer of 1939. It seemed evident that the AngloFrench spokesmen were stalling for time. The negotiations were
ended when the Soviet Union signed its ten-year non-aggression
pact with Nazi Germany, August 24, 1939.
Molot?v, speaking before the All Union Soviet Sept. I, 1939,
described the episode thus: ttThe decision to conclude a non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany was adopted after
military negotiations with France and Great Britain had reached
an impasse ... As the negotiations had shown that the conclusion
of a pact of mutual assistance could not be expected, we could not
but explore other possibilities of enduring peace and eliminating
the danger of war between Germany and U.S.S.R." (Tass text.
Daily Worker 9/2/39)
The Soviet-Nazi Pact was unexpected only to those who had not
followed the course of Soviet diplomacy after Munich. Rumors of
such a development were published as early as March I939. To the
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uninitiated, however, the pact was a thunderclap out of a clear sky.
The Soviet-Nazi Pact marked the end of the Munich Alliance.
The iron ring had been broken. Soviet diplomacy, for a price, had
been able to disrupt the Munich combination and thus to guarantee
itself against an invasion in which all of the major nations of
Europe would have participated, directly or indirectly. The Nazis,
on their side, had gained access to the wheat of the Ukraine and the
metals of the Urals. This source of food and raw materials would
partly counter-balance the American, African, Asiatic and Australasian sources upon which the Anglo-French Allies were drawing. In exchange for food and raw materials the Nazis agreed to
furnish manufactured goods, including machinery.
The Soviet-Nazi pact also marked the end of the European armistice and the beginning of World War II. It was immediately followed by the German invasion of Poland, the occupation of that
counry by German and Soviet armies, the treaty of September 29,
1939, fixing the boundaries between Soviet and German areas in
Poland, the withdrawal of German nationals from the Baltic states,
and the ultimate incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Finland, resisting Soviet overtures regarding
transfers of property that would have given the Soviet Government
control of the Mannerheim defence line, was invaded by the Soviet
Union, and after a costly winter campaign was defeated in 1940.
The Soviet-Nazi economic agreement was signed Feb. II, 1940.
A year later the official Tass agency, on behalf of the Soviet Government, issued a statement (Jan. 10, 1941) describing the series
of Soviet-Nazi agreements made up to that time. The series included the ttenlarged economic agreement of January 10, 1941
under which the U.S.S.R. delivers to Germany industrial raw
materials, oil products and food-stuffs, especially cereals; Germany
delivers to the U.S.S.R. industrial equipment." (N. Y. Times
1/11/4 1 text) On June 22, 1941 Axis armies invaded the Soviet
Union. Eleven months later, May 26, 1942, the Soviet Union signed
its Twenty Year Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain. Thus, within three years, the Soviet Union had been a neutral in the struggle
between Nazi Germany and the British Empire, an ally of Germany, and an ally of Great Britain.
The Soviet-Germany treaty of August 1939 had taken the form
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a ten year non-aggressiDn pact. The AnglD-SDviet treaty was
a twenty year Dffensive and defensive military and eCDnDmic alliance. The parties to. the treaty agreed to take jDint action against
aggressiDn; to' render each Dther mutual assistance during W Ddd
War II; RDt to' cDnclude a separate peace; to. take joint actiDn
against future agressiDn; to. render each Dther mutual assistance
in any future war against the Axis pDwers. The parties ctagree to.
wDrk tDgether in clDse and friendly cDllabDratiDn after the reestablishment of peace fDr the DrganizatiDn of security and eCDnDmic prDsperity in EurDpe." The two. parties further agreed to.
render Dne anDther all pDssible eCDnDmic assistance after the war
and (tnDt to cDnclude any alliance and not to. take part in any coalitiDn directed against the Dther high cDntracting party." (Great
Britain. Treaty Series. 1942. No.. 2 Cmd. 6376) '.
The next three years were almDst equally eventful. The treaty
with CzechDsIDvakia was signed in December 1943; the treaty
with France in December 1944. The agreement with the new
Yugoslav FederatiDn was likewise drawn up in December 1944
as was the agreement with the PDlish PrDvisiDnal GDvernment.
During 1945 the SDviet UniDn recDgnized the Warsaw GDvernment, established a prDvisiDnal Austrian gDvernment in Vienna
and was maintaining friendly gDvernments in Hungary and
RDumania.
If SDviet diplDmatic relatiDns between 1921 and 1945 appeared
like JDseph's cDat of many cDIDrs, the eVDlution Df SDviet pDlicy
in EurDpe was in reality bDth cDnsistent and cDnsecutive. FurthermDre, it cDrrespDnded very clDsely with the changing pDwer pDsitiDn Dccupied by the Soviet UniDn during this periDd.
SDviet Dbjectives in EurDpe might be summarized under four
headings: (1) peace and security, (2) ' assured in part by the establishment of strategic frontiers, (3) also. certain natural advantages such as a warm water Dutlet and the cDntrDI Df Dil reserves,
and finally, (4) a cDDrdinated EurDpe. Such Dbjectives did nDt
differ materially f rDm thDse Df Tzarist Russia. They cDrresponded
in substance with the objectives Df other majDr European pDwers.
They cDuld be realized in prDpDrtion as the Soviet power pDsitiDn improved vis-a-vis the pDwer positiDn of its neighbDrs.
The SDviet power pDsition altered materially during the two
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decades following 1921. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the Polish
War cost the Soviet Union territory. It had no prestige to lose.
League membership restored a measure of respectability and gave
Soviet representatives an opportunity to make their pleas for
disarmament and collective security from a rostrum in Geneva,
Switzerland, but in the big power game of the 1930s the Soviet
Union was clearly on the defensive. The occupation of Manchuria
by Japan and of Ethiopia by Italy, the course of the Spanish War
and the Munich Pact of 1938 could all be interpreted as triumphs
for the enemies of Sovietism. The Anti -Comintern Axis Pact was
a public declaration of intent to smash the Soviet Union. The
Atlantic Charter was formulated without Soviet participation. It
was not until the successful defense of Stalingrad that the Teheran
Conference was held and the Big Two was expanded into the Big
Three. It was only in 1944 that the Red Army succeeded in leaving Russian territory and in occupying portions of Norway,
Finland, the Baltic states, Roumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Hungary and Germany. When World War II began,
thirteen small states, from Finland on the north to Greece on the
south, separated the Soviet Union from Germany and Italy. By
the summer of 1945 the Red armies had occupied Berlin and
Vienna and everyone of these thirteen states, with the exception
of Greece, had either been incorporated into the Soviet Union or
had been brought within the Soviet sphere of influence.
Soviet spokesmen sometimes pretend that their foreign policy
is unchangeable. The Soviet Information Bulletin, published by
the Soviet Embassy in Washington, contained an article in the
November 16, 1944 issue by Colonel A. Galin, listing the six
basic principals of foreign policy which the Soviet Union has been
consistently following si!1ce the Bolsheviks secured power:
1. Peaceful relations with all states irrespective of their political systems.
2. Economic and political cooperation with all states on the
basis of sovereign equality and independence of the contracting parties and the co-existence of two systems.
3. Alliances with any state with the purpose of protecting
both partners from acts of aggression.
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4. Categorical renunciation of imperialistic expansion at the
cost of other nations.
5. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.
6. Strengthening of the coalition of freedom-loving nations in
the fight against Fascist aggressors.
Soviet diplomats may have had some such list of principles in
mind, but their actual policies were shaped by their power position.
Immediately after the revolution they tried unsuccessfully to preserve their frontiers against aggression. During the next fifteen
years their policy was clearly and emphatically defensive. Stalin
told the I7th Party Congress: HOur foreign policy is clear. It is ~
policy of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations
with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody-let alone of attacking anybody . We stand for peace and
champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and
are prepared to answer the instigators of war blow for blow.
Those who want peace and are striving after business intercourse
with us will always receive · our support. And those who try to
attack our country will receive a stunning rebuff to teach them not
to shove their hogs' snouts into our Soviet garden again." (Inprecor
2/I3/34 p. 239) It was I939 before Soviet spokesmen were demanding the restoration of Russia's I9I3 frontiers, and Molotov,
in his radio address of Sept. I7, I939, was saying: HNor can it be
demanded of the Soviet Government that it remain indifferent to
the fate of its blood -brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians
in...l}abiting Poland, who even formerly were without rights and
who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate." (Tass text.
N. Y. Times 9/I8/39) In the same year Moscow insisted, by the
use of military force, that the Finnish frontier be. so readjusted
that the guns on the Mannerheim line were no longer an immediate physical menace to Leningrad. On April 2, I944 Foreign
·Commissar Molotov received the representatives of the foreign
press in Moscow and made an official statement on behalf of the
Soviet Government. The Red Army, he said, is about to enter ·
Roumania, in pursuit of German forces. ccThe Soviet Government
declares it does not pursue the aim of acquiring Roumanian territory or of altering the existing social structure of Roumania. The
entry of Soviet troops into the boundaries of Roumania is dictated
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exclusively by military necessities." (Official text N. Y. Times
4/3/44) Seven months. later, Pravda, writing editorially on HThe
Red Army's Great Mission of Liberation" stated: HIn this war we
are seeking neither foreign territories, nor power nor prestige.
Poland and the world know we are going westward for one purpose-to liberate peoples from their enslavers." (N. Y. Ttimes
11/21/44) '
It was a far cry from the days of Soviet weakness, when the
Red Army was being driven back from Warsaw by the Alliedsupported Polish troops, to the victorious sweep of the Red
Armies across the Polish plains in their pursuit of retreating
Nazi forces. In the days of the civil wars Soviet military forces
were engaged in a desperate and unsuccessful effort to protect
their frontiers. In 1944-45 the Red armies were occupying the
whole of central Europe.
What is a foreign policy? It does not consist of either a declaration or of a set of principles. Rather, it is a series of workable
alternatives. The Soviet Union is a state attempting to survive
in a world of rival-and potential enemy-states. Soviet policy
must therefore be determined by the actions of its potential enemies. If Berlin and London join hands in a Munich Pact, the Soviet
Government must counter by some move that will successfully
protect Soviet interests against this threatened combination. If
London offers Moscow assistance immediately upon the announcement of the Nazi invasion, Moscow must respond with the AngloRussian Twenty Year Treaty as the most available method of
meeting the Nazi menace. Moscow foreign policy, in other words,
is made only partly in Moscow. Most Moscow decisions are condtioned by decisions previously made in London, Berlin and
Tokyo. Furthermore, Moscow's policy must be sufficiently multiple so that it can be readily adjusted to London and Berlin
decisions. After Munich, Moscow negotiated with both London
and Berlin. Since Berlin offered the best terms, Moscow signed
the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
Weak nations have their foreign policies made almost exclusively in foreign capitals. They are then classed as satellite states.
Powerful nations make policy in proportion to their power. This
fact appears in the decisions taken by the Big Three and accepted
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by the other members of the United Nations. When the Soviet
Union was weak it was compelled to adopt policies in terms of
the relative strength of neighboring capitals. With the Teheran
Conference in November 1943 the strength of the Soviet Union
was officially recognized. From that time forward Moscow was
able to make policy on a parity with London and Washington.
Moscow did make policy. For example, with regard to the government of Poland. London was supporting a Polish -Government
in exile. Moscow was supporting a Free Poland Committee. When
the Red Army occupied Warsaw the Moscow-supported Polish
Government moved there. Cable appeals from Washington and
the personal visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow were
insufficient to alter the Russian determination with regard to the
Warsaw regime. The struggle was continued during the pre-San
Francisco conversations in Washington in mid-April 1945 and
was carried into the San Francisco Conference. The Soviet Union
was able to maintain its stand because its armies were in Poland
and it had developed sufficient economic strength to give it a
good bargaining position.
Policy in foreign affairs is thus an attribute of power. In our
discussion of the Soviet Union as a world power, we pointed out
that between 1941 and 1945 the Soviet military apparatus, backed
by Soviet production and by the Russian population, had won for
the Soviet Union a position among the Big Three powers. During
these same years Soviet foreign policy underwent a change that
corresponded with its altered power position. Moscow policy was
no longer dependent in the main upon moves made in London,
Berlin and Tokyo. Berlin and Tokyo were both out of the running. London and Washington were watching and wondering
what Moscow would do next. In short, Moscow had secured the
diplomatic initiative.
At -the beginning of this discussion on the role of the Soviet
Union in Europe we listed the series of alliances and re-alliances
between Moscow and other European capitals. From 1934 to 1945
there was a considerable rise in the tempo of these changes. Thus
far there is no indication of any diminution in this respect, altho
it seems probable that the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942 is still the
keystone of Soviet relations with western Europe. In view of our
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analysis of the changing Soviet power position and of the nature
of foreign policy, the past two decades of Soviet-European relations may be construed in the following manner. Immediately after
the Russian revolution the Bolsheviks issued flaming proclamations, calling upon the workers of the world to arise and overthrow their oppressors. This revolutionary offensive was accompanied by a notably defensive diplomacy. The middle twenties
found the Friends of the Soviet Union organized in various bourgeois capitals as a means of defending Moscow against a potential
bourgeois assault. Soviet diplomacy was still on the defensive.
During the Civi1.War in Spain, while the Soviet Union gave active
support to the Republic, it did so in the name of completing a
bourgeois revolution. The Latvian Treaty of October 5, 1939,
Article V, guaranteed the contracting parties against any interference with their sovereign rights ttin particular their state o~ganiza
ion, economic and so~ial systems and military measures". Here
Bolshevism was on the defensive in revolutionary terms, but the
Soviet Union was definitely on the diplomatic offensive. The
Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942 found the Soviet Union again on
the diplomatic defensive. Soviet representatives signed a mutual
assistance agreement providing for mutual diplomatic support and
all possible economic assistance after the war. It was not until the
turn of the war at Stalingrad that the Soviet Union was again able
to take the diplomatic initiative expressed in its treaty with Czechoslovakia (December, 1943), its open and vigorous support for
Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Federation (1944), the SovietFrench Treaty (1944), the recognition of the Lublin Government
(1944), of the Warsaw Government (1945) and the distribution
of land to Polish and other peasant inhabitants of the central
European territories from which the Nazi armies had been expelled.
The Soviet Union was reaching out, no longer in terms of world
revolution, but in terms of enlarged frontiers, military occupation of neighboring non-Russian areas, and the establishment there,
under Soviet auspices, of Moscow-sponsored friendly governments.
The situation of 1918-19 was thus completely reversed in 194445. At the earlier date an all-powerful France was sponsoring
friendly governments in the newly-created states that made up the
cordon sanitaire between bolshevik East Europe and capitalist
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West Europe. The cordon sanitaire was established for the deliberate purpose of preventing the spread of bolshevism. The French
sponsors of these synthetic governments were doing their bit in
the defense of bourgeois society. At the later date an all-powerful
Soviet Union was sponsoring friendly governments in the re-created
states that made up the cordon sanitaire between bolshevik East
Europe and the remnants of capitalist West Europe. This cordon
sanitaire was established for the deliberate purpose of enlarging
bolshevik influence. The bolshevik sponsors of these synthetic governments were doing their bit to extend sovietism into an everwidening circle of mid-Europe territory.
During the troubled years that ushered in the present European
crisis there seemed to be four broad possibilities for the continent:
Continued division into a score of sovereign states under
the balance of power principle actively supported by Great
Britain and generally accepted by the ruling classes of the
European nations.
2. Coordination under German auspices, first, the imperial
Germany of the Hohenzollerns; and second, under Nazi
Germany.
3. Coordination under Soviet auspices: first, of the world
revolution; and second, of the victorious Red Army, expelling Nazi military forces and replacing them by Soviet
armies of occupation.
4. A united sbttes or free federation of Europe, organized as
a result of voluntary action among the member states in very
much the same way that the English colonies in North America formed their federation in 1789.
Division, and a competitive struggle for power employing
modern machine weapons, have proved so costly that their continuance would have involved the obliteration of European culture. The alternative was some form of unification. Since British
policy precluded such unification, two possibilities remained, coordination under Germany or under Russian auspices. Twice the
Germans bid for European leadership and twice they failed,
because in both cases they were opposed not only by substantial
European forces but by the joined strength of Great Britain, her
dominions, the United States and its satellites, working under
I.
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the general direction of British policy. The first Russian bid for
European domination along the lines of general revolution was
met by the united opposition of bourgeois Europe, supported by
the remainder of the bourgeois world. The second Russian bid for
the control of Europe took an entirely different form. The Soviet
Union, functioning as the defender of European culture against
the menace of Nazi barbarism, was able to align not only the antiNazi forces of the European continent but the full strength of the
Anglo-American combination. And since in this struggle Red Army
men did the bulk of the fighting and dying in behalf of the antiNazi cause, they were able to secure agreements at Teheran, Yalta
or elsewhere, under which the whole of Central Europe, including
Eastern Germany with its capital, Berlin, fell within the Soviet
sphere of influence.
The Soviet Union occupied the eastern half of Europe before
1939. The capitalist empires occupied the western half, including
the whole Mediterranean Basin. In terms of natural resources, the
position of the U.S.S.R. was probably superior. The production
potential and the population potential, both in terms of volume
and training, were strongly on the side of the capitalist empires.
Had the capitalist empires been able to establish and maintain a
united front as they attempted to do through the League Covenant,
through the Non-Intervention Committee, and through Munich,
their combined political strength would have been far greater than
that of the Soviet Union. Again and again, however, the capitalists
split amongst themselves. The final division, which came with the
initiation of World War II, gave the Soviet Union an overwhelming advantage. Once the Soviet military forces had turned back
the Nazi invasion it was only a question of time before a united
Soviet Union would out-point divided western Europe.
This is the background against which Marshal Smuts, in November 1943, assigned to the Soviet Union its role as the colossus
bestriding the European continent. This is the background against
which the Soviet Union took and held the diplomatic initiative in
support of the Moscow Polish Government as opposed to the
london Polish Government. This is the background against which
the Soviet Union has re-established the frontiers of Tzarist Russia
and is successfully surrounding those frontiers with a broad belt
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of Soviet-sponsored friendly governments. This is the background
against which the Soviet Union, in I944, stepped out of its own
sphere of influence, extended its official recognition to General de
Gaulle and unofficially demanded that action be taken to' liquidate anti-Soviet gavernments in Spain or wherever else they
might be functioning.
The Soviet military and diplamatic offensive has created cansternation in many a baurgeois circle. There is every ·reason for
this consternation. The Allied offensive after W arid War I,
directed to' the liquidation af balshevism, inspired every Bolshevik and Balshevik-sympathiser in the world with apprehensian
far the future of the working masses. The apprehension was justified. The Allied affensive in the form af military intervention
in the Saviet Union failed. The second phase of the Allied offensive, in the form of Fascist governments thraughout middle
Eurape was a serious menace to the newly farmed republics,
including the Soviet Republic. In its autcame, however, it braught
disaster to the bourgeois world, and apened the gates wide to'
admit Soviet culture. The Saviet Union is an econalnic and palitical colas sus bestriding the European continent. Its strength and
its success lie in two chief directians. In the first place, in the
failure of bourgeais saciety to provide peace and security for its
own peaple. In the second place, in the success of the Saviet
Union in offering the only wO'rkable alternative to' bourgeais
culture thus far inaugurated.
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IV. THE 5 0 V lET U N ION I N A 5 I A
Geographically, there is no valid line that marks off Asia from
Europe. The two continents are supposed to be divided by the Ural
Mountains, a worn-down range, that has the general appearance
of a rough plateau. It bears so little resemblance to a barrier that
Asiatic nomads have been able to sweep across it repeatedly. Actually, Asia and Europe are one land mass in the same sense that
eastern United States and Western United States are one land
mass. The Soviet Union occupies the entire northern section of
this land block.
Culturally, Asia differs from Europe. The Asiatic cultures are
older, and until comparatively recent times were diffused into
Europe. The last episode in the series took place at the time of the
Crusades. During recent centuries, however, European culture,
particularly that connected with technology, . has been diffused
throughout Asia. The process of this diffusion has involved the
subjugation of Asia to European control. This process went on in
Russia, as it did elsewhere, with the steady eastward movement of
trade, colonization and the expansion of political authority.
Twentieth century Asia differs from twentieth century Europe
in four essential respects: ( I) the population of Asia is over
twice that of Europe; (2) the people of Asia dwell f9r the most
part in villages and are engaged chiefly in agriculture; (3) European
technology is more highly developed; (4) European empires had
succeeded by the end of the last century in reducing almost the
whole of Asia to colonial status.
Soviet policy in Asia displays some of the general characteristics
of Soviet policy in Europe, but since policy is a relationship between
the policy-making centre and the territory in which policy is made,
the differences in the objective situations of Europe and Asia have
necessarily modified Soviet policy-making.
The Russian Revolution succeeded in replacing a decadent
monarchy by a Soviet Republic. Events surroundng the Russian
Revolution were also responsible for eliminating ruling dynasties
in Germany, Austro-Hungary, Greece and Spain. This breakdown
in the structure of European monarchies was paralleled by a break50

down in the structure of European capitalism. The breakdown had
two aspects. One was domestic. It involved job-insecurity for
workers and a falling rate of profit for business men. The other
aspect was colonial. It involved the growth of independence movements, the organization of colonial revolts, systematic boycotts and
sabotage directed against imperial overlords. The empire system,
with its centre in Europe and its circumference in Asia, Africa
and Latin America, was breaking up. The Bolsheviks inherited a
disrupted empire. Their European capital was surrounded by decaying imperial structures.
Soviet policy in Europe was conditioned by the presence of four
other great powers: Britain, France, Germany and Italy. There
was only one great power in Asia: Japan. Europe was accustomed
to a balance of power. Asia knew no balance except that of competing imperial interests.
There was a force in Asia, however, which did not exist in
Europe. The people of Asia were emerging from their colonial
vassalage. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 preceded the Russian
Revolution by six years. Nationalist movements were already well
developed in India and the Near East. Asia was in turmoil long
before World War 1. The cutting off of manufactured supplies
from accustomed European sources during that war gave the impetus to Asiatic industrialization which pushed Japan quickly to
the level of a first-class industrial area and added substantially to
the industrial productive capacity of both India and China.
Significantly enough, the situation in considerable portions ot
Asia is quite similar to that existing in the Russia of 1900. Industrialization has made advances, but to a considerable degree it has
employed foreign capital and has developed under foreign technical direction. The masses are village dwellers, gaining their living by agriculture. There are, however, large industrial and commercial centres in which there is a developed wage-working class,
the more advanced sections of which are versed in the principles
of the class struggle and the concepts of Marxian socialism. The
middle class is small and relatively ineffective. The ruling class
is divided between landowners, moneylenders, merchants, traders
and manufacturers, whose interests are divergent and in many cases
conflicting. For the most part there is no such national solidarity
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as has been built up in the principal nations of western Europe.
Japan must be excepted from this description, as must also the
newly-industrialized areas of Siberia. For the most part, however,
Asia is dominated by cultural cross-currents, by blurred political
divisions, by foreign imperial economic and political controls,
and by the will of a considerable section, particularly among the
young, that is demanding technical improvements and national
independence.
While the bulk of Russian population and technology are still
centred in Europe, strategic considerations have led to a rapid
development of various Asiatic territories. The policy of moving
industry beyond the Urals was well-matured by 1930. World War
II, which cost Russia important industrial areas adjacent to Poland
and Czechosovakia, forced the transfer of large industrial units
into Siberia. The movement of production into Asia may therefore be described as one of the major aspects of present Soviet
policy. This applies to the development of natural resources,
the building of transportation facilities, the construction of industries and the transfer of populations. Politically the Soviet
Union is enlarging its European sphere of control and of interest.
The basic Soviet movement, however, is undoubtedly Asia-ward.
What does the Soviet Union want in Asia?
1. It desires to develop the considerable agricultural, mineral
and power resources of Russia-in-Asia, as a basis for a production area far removed from invading armies and bombing planes.
2. Peace and security in Asia will facilitate this development,
and they are therefore among the primary Asiatic, as they
are among the primary European, aims of the Soviet Union.
nationalist organizations, freed from imperial domination
3. The emergence of colonial movements into well-formulated
and engaged in the establishment of independent Asiatic
states. Thus far there is no indication that the Soviet Union
will go any further in its attempts to influence the internal
organization of these Asiatic states than it has gone with
similar states in Europe. Undoubtedly, however, Soviet policy will aim to have such Asiatic states as border on the
Soviet Union administered by friendly governments.
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4. Exclusion from Asia of all non-Asiatic imperial controls.
5. Exclusion from Asia of any power combination or federation that .~ight challenge the Asiatic supremacy of the
Soviet TJnion.
6. A sufficient limitation upon the existing power of Japan to
prevent that country from interfering with Soviet Asiatic
policy, but in the absence of a strong Soviet China, a Japan
powerful enough to act for the Soviet Union in the capacity
of a Far Eastern policeman.
7. Free access, through adequate port facilities, to a free Mediterranean, a free Red Sea and Indian Ocean and a free
Pacific Ocean.
Soviet relations with Asia have been at least as turbulent as with
Europe, except that the Soviet Union has not thus far engaged in
a major war with any Asiatic power. Asia was in turmoil long
before the Bolshevik Revolution. Tzarist Russia had contributed its
share toward this turmoil. Aggressive imperial adventures in Korea
and Manchuria had brought on the Russian-Japanese War of
1904-5. Britain's far-flung interests in the Near East, India, Tibet
and the Far East, led the British to use Japan, unofficially before
1902 and officially from 1902 to 1922, and again unofficially from
1922 to around 1937, as the British policeman in Asia. It was
while performing this policing duty in 1904 that Japan attacked
Port Arthur and administered a heavy naval and military defeat
to the Tzar's armed forces. At the time, British policy was based
on the assumption that from the Dardanelles to the Pacific the
most formidable of Britain's rivals was Tzarist Russia.
Like every war, the Russian-Japanese War stirred up unrest
that pointed actively toward revolution. The revolution came first
in Russia, in 1905, and was followed by a series of nationalist
movements throughout Asia that culminated in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Bolshevik revolutionists, among whom Stalin was
one of the leaders, linked up the colonial nationalist movements
with bolshevism. European revolutionaries were seeking to overthrow capitalist imperialism in its European homeland. Colonial
revolutionaries, through their struggle for independence, were
administering a check to -the movement for imperial expansion.
What more natural, the Bolsheviks argued, than that the working
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class revolutionists of Europe should join hands with their colonial fellow-revolutionists in a simultaneous attempt to crush imperialism at its centre and at its circumference? Even before they
came to power in Russia, therefore, the Bolsheviks had formulated a theory that connected European with colonial revolution.
Another factor pushed strongly in the same direction. Tzarism
had ruled over a nation composed of many divergent racial and
national groups. By keeping these groups at sword's points and
by using the man power of one to police the others, .the Tzar's
regime was able to rule over a divided community. Bolshevism
embodied a program of national cultural self-determination under
which each minority should enjoy the right to shape its own cultural life in so far as that did not interfere with its neighbors.
The cultural self-determination of minorities was paralleled by a
centralized system of social, economic and political planning and
organization. Instead of living at sword's points, the national
minorities were expected to cooperate in the interest of the whole
composite community.
This formulation of the principle of self-determination in local
affairs and of centralized control of general matters was translated
into Asiatic politics first by the Bolshevik renunciation of special
privileges held by the Tzarist regime in Turkey, Persia and China.
Second, by active offers of help directed toward nationality groups
struggling to throw off the shackles of imperial domination. Since
the high point in Asiatic colonial revolt was China, the high point
in Bolshevik assistance was reached in that country. Between 1919
and 1926 Sun Yat-Sen and his followers turned definitely to the
Soviet Union for help in their independence struggle. After repeated attempts to obtain aid from the United States and from
various European governments, Sun Yat-Sen became convinced that
his best source of support was the Soviet Union. At the request of
his government, and of the People's Par.ty which he headed, the
Soviet Union sent to China a corps of technical assistants that at
one time numbered approximately three hundred. The titular head
of this group was Michael Borodin. Under the split in the Chinese
People's Party (1926-7), and the defection of Chiang Kai-shek,
Commanding General of the People's Party armies, the Russian
advisors and technical assistants played an important role in the
54

formulation of policy and in the direction of the Chinese revolutionary movement.
The split in the People's Party further divided an already segmented China into two contending groups: the Chiang Kai-shek
regime, in close touch with Chinese business and banking interests
and with various imperialist governments, of which the most helpful financially was the United States, and the Chinese Soviet Government, supported ideologically and to a minor extent materially
by Moscow.
Between 1927 and 1936 one of the principal preoccupations
of the Chiang Kai-shek regime was the organization of a series of
expeditions financed and equipped in part by western imperialists
and directed against the Chinese Soviet areas. Agnes Smedley,
Edgar Snow and others have described these struggles in detail.
During the same years the chief preoccupation of the Chinese
Soviets was the organization of a workable planned economy and
polity that was adapted to the peculiar needs of a semi-colonial
country seeking independence. The decade ended with the Chinese
Soviets still functioning and, in December 1936, entering into an
agreement with the Chiang Kai-shek regime for joint action against
the Japanese invaders.
The conflict between Chiang and the Chinese Soviets had afforded Japan an opportunity of which she had taken full advantage,
first by occupying Manchuria, and thus cutting off the easiest
avenue through which Soviet material assistance could reach China,
and second, by seizing and occupying portions of North China,
splitting China away from the Soviet Union and providing Japan
with a corridor that led into the Lake Baikal region and laid the
basis for a Japanese military assault aimed at cutting the TransSiberian railroad and adding a slice of eastern Siberia to the rapidly
expanding Japanese Empire. These developments of Japanese
major strategy took place between 1931 and 1936, and involved
the general occupation of China by Japan beginning in 1937.
No figures are available showing the exact amount of material
assistance sent by Russia into China during the twenty years that
ended in 1937. In the first decade the material aid was probably
considerable. In the second decade it diminished sharply. From
the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 until the German invasion
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of Russia in 1941 Soviet aid to China again increased. Military
necessity forced Soviet supplies to follow old caravan routes converted into extemporized truck roads across the Gobi Desert. U ntH
the early months of 1942 Soviet aid continued to reach China.
Then the pressure of invasion necessity and the sharpening differences between Cl iang and the Chinese Soviet leaders again led
to the curtailment of Soviet assistance. When the Teheran Conference assembled in 1943 Soviet representatives refused to meet
with those from China on the technical ground that while China
was at war \ vith Japan, the Soviet Union was not. Actually the
reason for this refusal undoubtedly lay in the strained relations
that had developed between Chiang's regime and the Chinese
Soviets, involving open warfare and the systematic blockade of
the Chinese Soviet areas by Chungking troops. The pattern was
also followed at Dumbarton Oaks, where Soviet representatives
refused to meet with those of Chiang's government.
Two nations have had a profound effect upon the development
of Republican China. One is Japan, the other is Russia. Speaking
generally, Japan has sought to dominate and ultimately to assimilate China as a part of its Far Eastern Empire. With minor exceptions Soviet Russia has extended consistent help to the movement
for a Chinese Republic in the hope that a China directed by a
Chinese Soviet Government would be able to win its independence from the western empires, industrialize China, raise the
standard of well-being of the Chinese masses and by so doing
blaze the trail toward a Soviet Asia.
Relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have passed
through various stages from friendly trade to open conflict. Japanese troops participated in the invasion of Siberia in the summer
of 1918. The end of the civil conflict in Russia was followed by
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and a decade
of strained collaboration. Soviet leaders mistrusted the intentions
of Japanese imperialists and Japanese leaders were greatly disturbed by the existence at Vladivostok of landing fields from
which the large, numerous and vulnerable industrial centers of
Japan could be disastrously bombed.
Japan's Manchurian adventure (1931) introduced an entirely
new element into the picture. Japanese armed forces were detailed
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along the Soviet-Manchurian frontier and as the Japanese military
moved farther into North China, a longer and longer line of
Soviet frontier was exposed to a possible attack.
Soviet military forces were distributed along the Soviet side of
the frontier. Preparations were made to defend the Trans-Siberian
railway which, for geographic reasons, ran very close to the Chinese territory now occupied by Japan. A new railroad line, well to
the north of the Trans-Siberian, was projected and constructed
and a new Soviet seaport was opened to the north of Vladivostok
and well beyond the range of an immediate Japanese attack.
For ten years Japanese and Soviet forces faced each other along
the frontier. Border clashes were reported at frequent intervals.
At times these clashes rose to the level of major combats in which
considerable numbers of troops, tanks, planes and artillery were
employed. Protests were made by both sides and relations were
strained to the breaking point. But there was no declared war.
On April 13, 1941, a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was signed
in Moscow. Article I of the Pact declared that ttboth contracting
parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations
between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and
inviolability of the other contracting party." Article II provided
that if one of the parties should become the object of hostilities
tton the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting
party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict. " Under Article III the treaty was to continue for five years
and then was to be automatically renewed unless one of the parties denounced the pact at least one year before its expiration.
There was an annex to the treaty under which ttthe two countries
solemnly declare that the USSR pledge to respect the territorial
integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to
restore the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian
Peoples Republic."
There has been considerable speculation as to why the SovietJapanese Pact was signed in the Spring of 1941. The Japanese
Government was preparing to enter the war and desired to free
herself as much as possible from the necessity of garrisoning the
Soviet-Manchurian frontier. At the same time, the Japanse Government was a party to the Anti-Comintern Pac~ and as such was
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more or less committed to a hostile position against the Soviet
Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had signed a somewhat similar agreement with Germany two years earlier and this
Soviet-Nazi agreement .h ad been reaffirmed and enlarged in January 194I. The Japanese therefore, in negotiating their pact with
the Soviet Union, were merely following a precedent already laid
down by their leading Axis partner.
The Soviet Union, by signing the pact with Japan, relieved itself,
at least in theory, from the danger of a two-front war. There were
many signs in the Spring of 1941 of an impending Nazi attack on
the Soviet Union. Should that attack come, Soviet military forces
would be hard-pressed if at the same time they were compelled to
maintain and supply a large garrison separated from the western
front by the entire breadth of European Russia and Siberia.
After the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Pact, reports of border
conflicts ceased to appear and relations between the two countries
seemed much less strained. Early in 1944 a supplementary treaty
was negotiated between the Soviet Union and Japan that had particular reference to the Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin.
The agreement provided that Japan should give up these concessions, that the Soviet Union should pay a stated sum of money to
Japan, and should in addition deliver a specified amount of the
petroleum produced in the Sakhalin oil fields. At the same time,
adjustments were made with regard to Japanese fishing rights in
Soviet waters. The treaty was sigried in Moscow March 30, 1944.
Soviet-Japanese political and economic relations were therefore
readjusted in the Spring of 1944 and there seemed every likelihood that the Pact of April, 1941 would be automatically renewed
at its expiration on April 13, 1946. Major political strategy, however, pressed strongly from several directions. There was a possibility that the Japanese High Command, checked in its attempt
to enlarge its territorial controls in southern Asia, might strike
north and attempt to take over the richly endowed territories of
eastern Siberia, add them to the resources of l\lanchuria and North
China and thus provide an extensive continental base for provisioning its war against the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on its
side, was in a rather serious predicament. It was aIIied with Great
Britain and was receiving extensive lend-lease supplies from the
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United States that were being used in a j oint war against Germany.
Germany was the senior partner in the Axis Alli~nce of which
Japan was now the only remaining important member. Quite
logically, the Soviet Union was being urged, directly or indirectly,
to make available Siberian bases from which the Anglo-Americans
might carryon their war against Japan. The Soviet Union was
receiving considerable quantities of lend-lease through its Pacific
ports. This commerce was of course subj ect to interference by the
Japanese sea and air forces. Furthermore, should Japan be defeated
by Anglo-American forces without the assistance of the Soviet
Uruon the settlement of many important Asiatic questions might
be made by the British and Americans without consulting the Soviet
Union.
These and other considerations led Premier Stalin in his speech
of November 6, 1944 commemorating the Bolshevik Revolution,
to make the following comment on Soviet-Japanese relations: HIt
cannot be considered accidental that such unpleasant facts occurred
as the incident at Pearl Harbor, the loss of the Philippines, and
other islands in the Pacific Ocean, the loss of Hong Kong and
Singapore, when Japan as an aggressive nation proved more prepared for war than Great Britain and the United States, which
pursued a policy of peace." This statement evidently meant that
the Soviet Government was seriously considering a termination of
the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Five months later, the Soviet
Foreign Office issued a statement giving Japan official notice of
Soviet intention to terminate the pact at its expiration in April
1946.
One other item should be mentioned in the catalog of Soviet
relations in Asia, -the oil reserves and oil concessions of Persia.
The Soviet oil position was relatively strong before the beginning
of World War II. Production figures for 1938 credited the Soviet
Union with 77% of European oil production for that year. Roumania had 18 %, and of the remaining 5 %, Germany had 1.5 and
Poland 1.3. As the war progressed, the oil reserves of Asia Minor
took on new significance. Rumor had it that the oil deposits in
Saudi Arabia were the most extensive untapped reserves in the
world. To the north and east lay the oil fields of Mesopotamia and
Persia. Still farther north were the principal oil fields of European
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Russia. Secretary of the Interior Ickes, from his vantage point as
United States petroleum administrator, launched an ambitious
program involving the drilling of wells in Arabia and the transportation of the oil produced to Mediterranean ports through
American-built pipe lines. The proposal aroused particular interest because the oil fields of the Eastern Mediterranean were at
that time dominated by British capital and American oil concerns
were trying to secure a foothold in the area.
The United States proposals led to counter-proposals from
Great Britain and the dispatch of a mission, headed by Lord
Beaverbrook, to discuss the entire problem with representatives of
the Washington Government. The upshot of this discussion was
the «Agreement on Petroleum between the Gbvernment of the
United States of America and the Government of the U njted
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland", signed August 8, 1944 by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius and Lord
Beaverbrook. Textually the agreement provided that ((preparatory
to ·the convocation of a world petroleum conference for the negotiation of a multilateral agreement . . . the two governments
agree that the development of petroleum resources for international trade should be expanded in an orderly manner on a worldwide basis." Whatever the intention of the signers, the AngloAmerican Oil Agreement sounded like a proposal under which
the two principal capitalist nations were to divide between themselves oil .reserves that promised to be an extrem·ely important
source of post-war economic and military power.
During the critical period of World War II, when Axis forces
were winning important victories and were evidently moving to
occupy Suez and to make a junction with their Japanese partners
somewhere in the Indian Ocean, Persia became an object of considerable strategic importance. This importance was enhanced by
the fact that supplies for the Soviet Union were being shipped to
the Persian Gulf and transported overland to the Soviet battlefronts. To forestall Axis occupation of Persia, the country was
occupied by the Red Army in the north, and by the British, later
supplemented by American armed forces in the south. British oil
interests in Persia were centred in the south and the British were
in a position to bring considerable pressure to bear upon the Per-
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sian Government. While the evidence is far from complete, there
seems reason to believe that British and American interests were
seeking additional concessions from the Persian Government,
whereupon the Soviet Government proposed that parallel oil
concessions be granted to the Soviet Union in the northern portion of Persia then occupied by the Red Army.
These proposals, which were made during 1944, accorded ill
with the Declaration on Iran adopted by Roosevelt, Stalin and
Churchill at their Teheran meeting in November 1943. The Iran
Declaration had provided that the three governments "will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic
assistance as may be possible." The last paragraph of the Declaration stated that the three governments "are at one with the
Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran."
The refusal of the Iran Government to grant the Soviet concessions or any other concessions during the continuance of the
war led to a change of administrations, to denunciations in the
Soviet press, and ultimately to a suspension, at least as far as
public activity was concerned, of the whole program for dividing
up Near East oil reserves. In theory at least the issue remains in
abeyance, but during the controversy over these oil reserves Moscow had served notice upon London and Washington that it was
prepared to assert its claim to a fair share of such important
economic advantages as Near East oil.
Irrespective of theoretical considerations, it seems obvious that
Soviet policy has been evolving in Asia as it has been evolving in
Europe. Whatever the Soviet attitude- toward Asiatic problems
may have been during the 'critical 1930s, Soviet policy in Asia is
now. defensive in name only. With the progressive weakening of
Japan under Anglo-American pressure, and the increasing probability of a severe military defeat, the Soviet Union remains as the
only important resident power in Asia. British-American and
other western imperialist groups mayor may not retain or reestablish their colonial position in the East Indies, in the Pacific
Islands or on the Asiatic mainland. The Soviet Union after the
defeat of Japan will be the one Asiatic nation with an immediate
post-war industrial and military potential. The end of the war in
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Europe enabled Soviet diplomacy to take increasing advantage of
this unique strategic position.
There are two avenues along which Soviet policy in Asia may
move. The first is that already well established in Europe-a firmly held Soviet frontier bordered by a number of friendly governments, free to conduct their local affairs as they see fit, but
strongly bound to Moscow in all matters involving foreign policy.
Beginnings in this direction have already been made. The Outer
Mongolian Peoples Republic has been functioning for more than
,twenty years in this capacity. Since some time in 1944 an obscure
conflict has been progressing in Chinese Turkestan that may easily
convert that territory into a Singkiang Peoples Republic resembling that of Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Soviet areas offer a third
possibility in this same general direction. Whether Manchuria
will be returned to China or be converted into a friendly border
state dependent upon the Soviet Union for its major policies is
a matter that will be decided as a result of the defeat of Japan.
In Asia as in Europe an important power centre is in process
of liquidation. The liquidation of a power centre necessarily involves the redistribution of the power elements composing that
centre. The Japanese ruling class hoped to create a Far East empire of continental dimensions. By 1942 they had established such
an organization, at least in temporary form. The disintegration of
the Far East Prosperity Sphere will be followed by one or more
reintegrations of power. For example, the whole of China may be
unified under a strong central government, including Manchuria
and a semi-independent Korea. India and Burma may be federated under ,the British Empire or with independent status. Similarly, an Arab federation may unify important areas of Asia Minor.
These are possibilities. The overwhelming probability is that the
Soviet Union will follow the general policy in Asia that it has
been following in Europe, discouraging federations of any considerable magnitude and encouraging the organization of minor
states friendly to the Soviet Union. Insofar as independence for
Asiatic colonial territories will eliminate foreign imperial controls from the area, ,the Soviet Union may be expected to continue
its policy of encouraging colonial nationalist movements.
The second avenue for Soviet-Asiatic policy differs susbtantially
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from that of maintaining numerous satellite states. It involves the
establishment and support of a power or powers capable of maintaining economic and political stability under the general direction of S-oviet policy. Japan performed this police function for
Britain through several decades. If Japanese power is thoroughly
liquidated it will be in no position to perform a similar function
under the direction of the Soviet Union. If Soviet spokesmen
decide on this aspect of power politics they will be compelled to
build up in India, China or perhaps in both territories, political
units strong enough to do continental policing, and also well
enough supplied with the implements of power to check or prevent aggression by any of the western empires, and ultimately to
terminate their imperial strangle-hold on Asiatic peoples.
One vitally important issue remains to 'be considered-that of
the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean in the next few decades will undoubtedly become one of .the most important if not the most
important area of world trade, commerce, industrial development
and social expansion. Should one nation succeed in dominating
the Pacific it would enjoy the power advantages accompanying
such a development. For a long time to come it seems unlikely
that the Soviet Union will be in a position to throw into the Pacific area a volume of wealth or manpower sufficient to ensure Pacific domination. If that is the case and if Soviet diplomacy proposes
to maintain a considerable degree of influence in the Pacific area,
this must in all probability be done through the agency of an
Asiatic police nation. To date, the only candidate for such a position is Japan. No other Asiatic nation has the industrial plant
and the skilled man power necessary to carry through such an
ambitious program. If Japan is to act with the Soviet Union as a
counterpoise to maintain the Pacific balance of power, Soviet
policy must necessarily protect Japan against a too serious military
or economic defeat.
Japanese empire builders attempted with only moderate success
to build up an ((Asia for the Asiatics" policy in which other
Asiatic countries could participate with a considerable degree of
autonomy. While the Japanese used the slogan, they insisted
upon centralizing most of the power in Tokyo.
The Soviet Union is an Asiatic power, controlling a large geo63

graphic area and is in many respects the most important industrial
area in Asia. There is every possibility that the Soviet leaders may
take a leaf out of Japan's torn notebook, revive the "Asia for the
Asiatics" slogan and launch a Pan-Asia movement that might
closely resemble the Pan-American movement headed by the
United States. In pursuit of such a policy the Soviet Union
would not only have the advantage of American precedent, but
through American insistence in San Francisco, the United Nations
has been so organized as to permit this type of dominated, regional federation. All things considered, the Soviet Union may find
that such a development will follow the line of least resistance,
will liberate Asia from foreign imperial control and establish the
Soviet Union in a role that, for the time being, is as dominant as
the role played by the United States in the Pan-American Union.
Soviet policy makers will probably follow at least one of these
suggested paths. They may follow all three, emphasizing one or
the other as circumstances dictate. There is one thing very certain,
however. Unless there is an internal breakdown in Soviet administration, and of this there is now not the slightest indication,
the Soviet role in Asiatic affairs will be at least as important as
that in European affairs. In all probability it will be more important, due to the absence in or near Asia of any power competent
to challenge or checkmate the Soviet Union.
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v.

THE U. S. S. R. AND THE U. S. A.

Thus far in our consideration of the Soviet Union as a world
power we have discussed the relations between Soviet Russia and
a partially wrecked Europe, as well as relations between Soviet
Russia and an Asia emerging from colonialism. We now turn to
a very different theme-the Soviet Union and the United States.
These two countries are the colossi O'f Marshal Smuts' Empire
Parliamentary Association speech: ttRussia is the new colossus in
Europe ... Then, outside Europe, you have the United States, the
other great world power. You will therefore have these three great
Powers: Russia, the colossus of Europe; Great Britain, with her
feet in all continents, but crippled materially here in Europe, and
the United States of America with enormO'us assets, with wealth
and resources and potentialities of power beyond measure."
Marshal Smuts is not alone in rating the Soviet Union and the
United States as the top-ranking powers of the world. Sumner
Welles holds the same point of view: ttln the first post-war years
the two greatest powers, both from a material as well as from a
military standpoint, will be the United States and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Frank recognition .of this fact must
underlie any consideratiO'n of the policy which this government
should pursue toward the Soviet Union." (Time f~rDelcision.
p. 306) *. A McGraw-Hill editorial O'n Russia, Threat or Promise, which occupied a full page in the Washington Post of October 18th, 1944, assumed that ttwhen this war is ended, two
nations-the United States and Russia-will possess the bulk of
the world's military and industrial might." In The Stlper Powers,
W. T. R. Fox argues that: ((It will be a commonplace after the
war to speak of the United States and the Soviet Union as the
tBig Two' whose falling out will be the curtain-raiser fO'r the
Third World War." (p. 101.)
In our discussion of the Soviet Union as a world power we
reached the conclusion that in terms of the recognized power
essentials the Soviet Union must be rated among the foremost
nations of the world. It now appears that we must go a step far-
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ther and assert that the Soviet Union must be rated as one of the
two foremost nations.
After the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union stood head and
shoulders above the remaining nations of continental Europe.
Before Pearl Harbor it was the only Asiatic nation other than J apan which might be rated as a major factor in world affairs. With
the defeat of Japan the Soviet Union will be the only modern
power in Asia. Both in Europe and Asia, therefore, the Soviet
Union stands out as a giant among pygmies. By comparison with
the United States, however, the Soviet Union faces another giant.
There is no easy way to compare the power potential of the Soviet Union and the United States. Both are continental in area, the
Soviet Union occupying nearly three times as much contiguous
territory as the United States. Both have abundant resources, those
of the Soviet Union largely untouched; those of the United States
depleted to some degree. Both countries have an ample agricultural base, with fertile land and climatic variations adapted t~ the
production of a variety of food and agricultural industrial raw
materials. Speaking from the standpoint of geography therefore,
the Soviet Union and the United States are two North Temperate
Zone powers amply equipped with natural advantages. In terms
of productivity the United States enjoys a consiqerable advantage
particularly in its capacity to turn out production goods and heavy
consumer goods on a mass scale. The consumer goods markets of
the United States have been glutted with commodities for two
generations, and the average American household is. therefore far
better equipped with a consumer goods surplus than households
in the Soviet Union. United States man power is better trained
technically than in the Soviet Union. On the other ~hand, the total
of Soviet man power exceeds that of the United States by about
50 percent, and the net annual population gain in the Soviet
Union is considerably above that in the United States. In terms of
leadership and management the Soviet Union ranks lower than
the United States as far as experience and technical competence
are concerned. At the same time, the average age of Soviet leadership is less than that in the United States. The military apparatus
of the United States is well manned and particularly well supplied with mechanical equipment. The United States navy and
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air force are larger than those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet
army, however, is probably larger than that of the United States
and has proved itself phenomenally efficient in its conflict with the
Axis. Finally, in our listing of power ingredients comes the question
of unity, solidarity and public morale. There is ample evidence
that despite staggering material and human losses, far exceeding
those of the United States, the Soviet population has displayed
steadiness and willingness to stand up under conditions of extreme hardship. It is possible that the United States population,
faced with a similar situation, would have displayed equal solidarity and tenacity of purpose .
.One other factor should be mentioned in a comparison between
the power position of the Soviet Union and the United States.
The Soviet Union represents a new social system, or perhaps
more correctly, a revolutionary adaptation of the existing social
order to conditions in the mid-twentieth century. The United
States, on the other hand, is dominated by a social order that
had its rise in Europe, that was transferred as a mature culture to North America, and that is now displaying in North
America the same characteristics of culture decay that exist in
the European countries still supporting a free enterprise economy.
If this is a correct sociological description, the United States
labors under the disadvantage of domination by a decaying social
order, while the Soviet Union enjoys the advantage of a new and
far more vigorous social apparatus.
There is no attempt here to. line the two countries up side by
side and to assert that one is stronger than the other. Rather, the
power potentials of the two are listed, and the conclusion to be
drawn is that these two countries are both immensly strong in
the essentials of power. In some respects the Soviet Union is
ahead; in other respects the United States leads.
Quite irrespective of the relative strength of the Soviet Union
and the United States, it seems obvious from what we have been
saying thus far that the post-war world will have two dominant
power poles. One will be located in Eurasia, the other in North
America. The Soviet Union and the United States will be the two
main centres of political and social gravity. These major bodies
will draw minor bodies to them with ,the same gravitational force
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that is exerted in the physical sphere by large bodies over small
bodies. Small nations will be drawn toward these power centres
with the same irresistible force that the powerful have always
been able to maintain over the weak. The small nations of Europe
and Asia are already feeling the pull of the Sovief centre of gravity. The nations of the Americas were long ago drawn within the
United States sphere of political influence.
There may possibly be a third post-war power centre. Attempts
will be made to establish one in western Europe with the British
Isles as the nucleus. Plans are already far-advanced to set up a
power centre in China. The leaders of Argentina and other Latin
American countries hope to organize a power centre in South
America. These are possibilities. The actuality of the immediate
post-war world will be two centres of power, one focussed in
Moscow, the other in Washington. Slnall nations, weak nations
and colonial peoples seeking liberation must perforce choose between these two major power possibilities. In mos't instances the
choice has already been made. There will be. defections and realignment, but in general it can be predicted that the gravity pull
of these ·two poles will vary inversely as the square of the distance between them and the small powers. Those in close proximity to the Soviet Union will of necessity be drawn Sovietward.
Those in close proximity to the United States will with equal
necessity be drav/n United Statesward.
We have no immediate experience in dealing with a two pole
world. Through the greater part of the 19th century Britain was
THE World Power. Then, as the struggle to redivide the world
matured, several competing powers replaced the One. During the
half century preceding World War I nearly a dozen powers had
world leadership pretensions. Between W orId Wars I and II the
number was cut to six or eight. With the defeat of the Axis
forces, the devastation of Germany and Japan, and the humbling
of France and Italy, another drastic cut in the number of world
powers has been made.
It will be necessary for us to readjust both .t hought and action
to the conditions surrounding a two pole world. At the moment
we are asking ourselves what the relations between these two
poles will probably be. We shall begin by discussing some of
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the contact points between the Soviet Union and the United
States. We shall then continue by asking whether these contact
points are likely to develop friction and to become conflict points.
Historically, the relations between Russia and the United States
have been almost uniformly peaceful. Twice Tzarist Russia actively
assisted the United States. The second time, during the American
Civil War, the intervention was of the greatest importance to the
Washington Government. Neither country has ever gone to war
against the other. With the exception of United States invasion of
Soviet territory during the counter-revolution, relations between
the two countries have been unmarred by military conflict.
The record is especially relnarkable because throughout the
entire history of the United States the Russian government has
been almost completely antithetical to the American government.
When the English colonies were federated in a democratic republic, Russia had one of the most absolute mon~rchies then in existence. This Russian monarchy continued in power until 1917 when
it was replaced by a revolutionary government, the declared object
of whicli was the liquidation of bourgeois democracy and the substitution of a world-wide federation of workers republics. How
did it come about that two governments so apparently opposite succeeded in maintaining peaceful relations for a century and a half?
Professor P. A. Sorokin has attempted to answer this question
in Russia and the U.S.A. Professor Sorokin marvels at tcthe
miracle of a lasting, unbroken peace . . . between these two
countries, extending throughout the entire history of the United
States." (p. 15) ' nWhen both countries, have happened to be involved in the same V/ar, they have invariably been ranged on the
same side, fighting a common enemy, whether in the case of the
Boxer uprising, the war of 1914-18, or the present war." (Ibid.,
p. 17) ' Sorokin attempts to explain this seeming miracle in terms
of what he describes as similar socio-cultural traits.
The Sorokin explanation acquires peculiar significance because
of the unusual background of the author. Professor Sorokin was
a prominent sociologist in pre-revolutionary Russia. As an official
in the Kerensky regime he came into conflict with the Bolsheviks,
left Russia and resumed his academic career in the United States,
where he has taught and written for two decades. He is now head
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of the Department of Sociology in Harvard. He has thus had the
unique experience of building an academic career in both Russia
and the United States. Out of this experience he writes his comparison of the two countries.
Professor Sorokin contends that the differences between Russia
and the United States are superficial, while the similarities are
fundamental. The village background, he argues, is much the
same in both countries. The organization of the family, the status
of women, the forms of local, municipal and ' provincial self-government, the legal and the judicial systems of the two are strikingly similar in many respects. Both countries are inhabited by
pioneer types. Both occupy vast, sparsely populated continental
areas. Both have been expanding consistently through several
generations. The Russian people and the American .people are both
interested in science and passionately devoted to technology. The
American people have been free to express their scientific and
technical interests since their separation from the British Motherland. The Russians were liberated scientifically and technologically
by the Revolution of 1917. Both in terms of institutions and of
world outlook these two peoples are following closely parallel
courses. Geographically they are barely in contact. In terms of political ideologies they are at variance. But the major socio-cultural forces point toward collaboration rather than toward conflict.
Peaceful relations between Russia and the United States are a
matter of history. The explanation of these peaceful relations lies
in the realm of social theory. Certainly Professor Sorokin has
offered an analysis which has the appearance of authenticity.
Expansion in the broad social sense of extending influence over
outlying territory is possible in terms of trade, conqu"est and ideas.
The American Revolution of 1776 gave the United States an opportunity to expand ideologically. The Russian Revolution of 1917
gave the Soviet Union a similar opportunity. During the 19th
century United States technology gained world-wide influence.
Since the middle 1920s Soviet techniques of social reorganization
have influenced the thinking and have helped to shape the social
policy of nations and peoples on every continent. It is quite conceivable that at some point in the not distant future another centre
of cultural expansion may develop. The Axis powers tried to estab70

lish such a centre and failed in their attempt. In the absence of
some such development the United States and the Soviet Union
will remain the two present-day centres of cultural, social and political expansion. They will touch in Europe. They will make direct
contact in the Pacific. The two countries represent contrasting and
rival social systems. Can they live together in peace or must contact
mature into conflict?
Immediately after the Russian Revolution Lenin raised the question of socialism overtaking and outdistancing the capitalist world.
From the Bolshevik point of view the science and technology
developed under capitalism were indispensable tools for socialist
construction. Capitalism had evolved these tools. Socialists must
learn to make them and to use them, must improve them "and must
ultimately supersede them. The Bolsheviks thus proposed to take
over the results of capitalist achievement and make them a part of
the techniques of socialist construction. Such an attitude involved
neither animosity nor antagonism. In fact, the Bolsheviks felt a
very great admiration for the technical devices of capitalism and
desired to make them their own.
The attitude in the capitalist world was of necessity profoundly
different. The Bolsheviks sought to supersede capitalism. The
capitalists desired to conserve and defend their institutions and
ideas against a revolutionary ideology and a political revolutionary
force that threatened their prerogatives and privileges. Spokesmen
for private property and big business felt that they had nothing to
learn from the builders of socialism, whereas if the socialists succeeded the capitalists had everything to lose. Consequently when
in March 1921 an appeal was made to the United States Department of State to re-establish business relations with the Soviet
Union, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes on March 25, 1921
replied through the American Consul at Reval that the American
government viewed ~'with deep sympathy and grave concern the
plight of the Russian people", and desired to aid in every possible
way in establishing commercial relations with them. Secretary
Hughes, however, agreed with Mr. Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, that under the existing economic system Russia could make
no return to production and therefore had no commercial future.
HIt is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for
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the Russian people," Secretary Hughes wrote. HIt is idle to expect
resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are
securely established." These bases must include ((the safety of life,
the recognition of firm guarantees O'f private property, the sanctity
of contracts and the rights of free labor" . Until Russia was prepared to mak~ such readjustments in its internal economic life, the
Secretary of State saw no possibility or resuming trade relations.
President CoO'lidge took the same position two years later.
(Message to Congress Dec. 6, 1923.) He held that the United
States could not enter into relations with another country which
refused to recognize ((the sanctity of international obligations" or
((the cherished rights of humanity." President Coolidge expressed
a desire ' ((to make very large concessions for the purpose of res-i
cuing the people of Russia." ((Whenever there appears any disPO'sition. to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to
recO'gnize that debt contracted with our government, not by the
Tzar but by the newly formed republic of Russia; whenever the
active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever
there appear works meet for repentance; our country ought to be
the first to go to the economic and mtoral rescue of Russia." It
was from such lofty eminences of economic and moral superiority
that United States officials looked down upon the spokesmen of
the infant Soviet Republic.
Ten years later, after the United States had tasted the bitterness of economic defeat, President Roosevelt did condescend to
recognize the Soviet Union. Recognition was extended, however,
only after Foreign Commissar Litvinov had agreed in his letter of
Nov. 16, 1933, ((to refrain, and to restrain all persons in government service and all organizations of the government or under its
direct or indirect control ... from any act overt or covert liable in
any way whatsoever to' injure the tranquility, prosperity, order, or
security of the whole O'r any part of the United States, its territories
O'r possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite
or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or propaganda
having as an aim the violation of the territorial integrity of the
United States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about
by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole
O'r any part of the United States, its territories or possessions."
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Thus the U !1ited States government maintained its position of
moral superiority and extended recognition to the Soviet Union
sixteen years after the beginning of the revolution.
During the interval, and in fact until 1941 or 1942, attitudes
in the two countries were maintained at very much the same
divergent levels. The Soviet Union continued to admire American
technological achievements. Throughout these years no antiAmerican sentiment was discernible among the Russian people.
On the contrary, even Russian school children were well-informed
about detailed matters affecting American life, while Russian
adults were omnivorously curious regarding United States institutions and practices. «Had the visitor to Russia seen Boulder
Dam? How did it compare with Dneiperstroy? Had he visited
the Ford factory in Detroit? Was Bolshevik tempo up to American industrial tempo? Did the leadership of the American Federation of Labor represent the viewpoint of American workers?"
There were endless variations on such questions, which were
never asked with either envy or animosity but out of a desire to
learn as a means of improving Soviet techniques.
American attitudes during the same period were dominated by
fear and hatred of Bolshevism and all its works. The most fantastic and ridiculous stories were printed in United States newspapers and circulated over the radio and by word of mouth. Any
distortion that reflected discredit on the Soviet Union was taken
up and endlessly repeated. Facts to the credit of the new regime
were ignored or suppressed. At one stage in this campaign of
mendacity the New Republic made a detailed study of New York
Times reporting on the Soviet Union, which showed that the
Titnes had been taking a consistent anti-Soviet attitude. The
Times pretended to do a job in objective reporting. The Hearst
and Scripps-Howard papers made no such pretence. They were
openly and bitterly anti-Soviet. The most ambitious anti-Soviet
educational campaign in the United States was carried on by the
Roman Catholic Church. Through all of the publicity agencies at
its disposal the Catholic Hierarchy preached and taught anti-Sovietism. Various business organizations, the American Legion, the
American Federation of Labor, and other influential associations
carried on the anti-Soviet campaign. Attempts were made by
73

various minority groups to counter anti-Soviet propaganda. For
every pro-Soviet word that was uttered or printed, however, there
were a hundred or a thousand on the other side. Consequently, an
entire generation of American people gained its outlook on world
affairs through a haze of anti-Soviet propaganda. That generation
is now coming to manhood and womanhood. It constitutes a hard
kernel of anti-Sovietism which must play an important role in
determining Soviet-American relations through the coming years.
Suppose we now attempt to translate the history of RussianAmerican friendliness and the sharply divergent Soviet attitude
toward the United States, and the United States attitude toward the
Soviet Union into political terms. By so doing we shall establish
a background against which Soviet-American relations have been
developing during the past few years, and against which they must
continue to develop during the years which lie immediately ahead.
Such an analysis must begin with a brief statement of the general
foreign policy of the two countries in relation to each other.
Soviet-United States relations grow out of different attitudes in
the two countries. They also grow out of different power positions. U.S.A. business interests girdle the globe. Wherever profitpossibilities present themselves United States business .men have
interests based upon trade, commerce, communications, raw materials and investments.
Soviet policy makers are not in business. Soviet interests therefore are restricted primarily to territory that surrounds the Soviet
Union or to issues that involve Soviet security. The United States
has vital interests in the Philippines, China, Malaya, Iran, Arabia,
Italy and Germany, as well as in the Americas. The Soviet Union,
on the other hand has few interests in Latin America. Thus while
American interests extend into territory that borders the Soviet
Union, Soviet interests do not extend, to anything like the same
degree, into territory that borders the United States.
These differences of interests are brought out very clearly in the
two recent controversies over Argentina and Poland. The United
States has a sphere of influence that includes the Western Hemisphere. Quite as a matter of course United States officials extend or
withhold credit and lend-lease, recognize or refuse to recognize latin American governments that win the approval of Washington
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or labor under its disapproval. This policy reached a point of high
intensity in the case of the Farrell regime in Argentina. -The regime
was denounced by Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt.
Restrictions were placed on commerce; credits were frozen. Attempts were made to line up other Latin American countries and
Great Britain for a general boycott of the Farrell regime. The
Soviet Union took no public part in the controversy. The Americas
were a region in which United States interests were paramount
and whatever Soviet sympathies may have been, Soviet officials
stuck to their knitting.
How different the situation in Poland! Poland bears the same
geographic relation to the Soviet Union that Cuba or Mexico bears
to the United States. Twice in a generation Russia has been invaded
through Poland. The pre-war Polish regime was anti-Soviet. The
Soviet Union, as a matter of major policy, proposed that the postwar government of Poland should be friendly to the Soviet Union.
Throughout the war the British Government, headed by an
anti-Soviet Tory, Winston Churchill, had maintained in London
a Polish Government-in-Exile that in its general attitude and in
its personnel was quite definitely pro-British and anti-Soviet. During the same period the Soviet Government had backed a Polish
Government-in-Exile in Moscow. With Europe divided into two
major spheres of influence-British in the west and south; Soviet
in the east, Poland became buffer territory and an object of special
interest to both London and Moscow.
What did Washington do under these circumstances? Washington intervened aggressively and insistently, although no United
States sphere of influence was involved. When Moscow recognized
the Lublin Polish Government in I944 London and Washington
both reaffirmed their recognition of the London Polish Government-in-Exile.
Soviet interests and Soviet policy both call for non-interv:ention
in a controversy between Washington and Buenos Aires. Latin
America is a United States sphere of influence. United States
interests and United States policy both call for intervention in a
controversy between London and Moscow over Poland. United
States interests are planet-wide.
Since these decisions deal with the Soviet role in world affairs,
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we shall first state the issues of major politics that exist between
the Soviet Union and the United States from the Soviet point of
I;
view:
i,

.

I

1. The Soviet Union has special interests in the territory that

borders directly upon the U.S.S.R.
2. These special interests are in the first place defensive. Moscow

desires to protect its territory against military aggression. It
also desires to protect its social order against the disorders and
disturbances that accompany civil war in neighboring countries.
3. Soviet special interests are likewise economic. The Soviet
Union wishes access. to raw materials such as oil, to harbors
and other channels of transportation and communication. The
Soviet Union desires to extend the practice of economic planning far enough to link up Soviet economy with the economy
of surrounding countries.
4. Soviet special interests are also cultural. The Soviet Union
would prefer to be surrounded by ctprogressive" communities: that is, communities that are developing Soviet or
socialist institutions.
In addition to these Soviet special interests. in contiguous territory which affect the United States only indirectly as they affect
the social system of which the United States is a part, there are
several aspects of Soviet foreign policy that affect the United
States directly, as a major world power.
5. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the presence
of a non-European world power on the European mainland.
This statement applies to military occupation primarily, although it would necessarily refer to the establishment of basic
economic interests which might lead to political and therefore
ultimately to military involvement. At this juncture in world
affairs only one non-European power could qualify as a possible agency for the establishment of controls in Europe. During World War I United States military forces were present
for a short period but were promptly withdrawn at the termination of the war. They were in Europe long enough, however, to take part in the military occupation of portions of
l-
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Soviet Russia. During World War II United States military
forces have been in Europe and Africa since 1941. According
to present plans they will remain as occupying forces i~
Germany and perhaps elsewhere for an indefinite period.
6. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to a non-Asiatic
world power on the Asiatic mainland. Up to the time of the
Russian Revolution every world power except the United
States held colonial territories on the mainland of Asia. The
United States occupied the Philippines. Germany was eliminated as a colonial power in Asia as a result of World War 1.
The outcome of World War II is not yet definite but it seems
quite possible that as a result of the Cairo Declaration of Dec.
1, 1943 Japan will be eliminated from the Asiatic mainland.
Even though French control of Indo China is re-established,
only one major non-Asiatic power, Great Britain, will occupy
a strong position in Asia, unless the United States succeeds
through its influence with the Chungking Government in
securing a continental foothold.
Nor can the Soviet Union remain indifferent to the establishment of any rival world power centre in Asia, no matter how
that centre may be constituted. The Axis combination in
Europe was such a centre. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere
was such a potential centre.
8. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to a monopoly
established by anyone power over the Atlantic, the Pacific, or
over any essential channel of communication such as the Dardanelles, SueZ' or the Straits of Malacca. Such monopolies in
the past have enabled their holders. to practice a strategy of
economic strangulation t~at might be disadvantageousor disastrous to any rival power.
7.

Most of these eight generalizations regarding Soviet policy are
obvious enough. All of them are based on the evidence alread)
presented in our discussions of Soviet relations with Europe and
Asia. They constitute a summary of the policies which the Soviet
Union seems to be pursuing or seems likely to pursue in the immediate future, in its dealing with the United States or with any
other world power.
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What can be said in parallel fashion regarding the foreign
policy of the United States?
1. The simplest generalization regarding United States foreign
policy is purely negative: the United States has no consistent
policy. There are three reasons for this. First, those who make
United States policy are not of one mind. Since the policy
makers do not agree, a unified, consistent policy is out of the
question. Second, the United States has moved so rapidly from
a position of isolationism into that of a first-class world
power, that its policy makers have had neither time nor
opportunity to formulate a policy consistent with the greatly
expanded economic and political interests of the country.
Third, United States policy has shifted irresponsibly from isolation to intervention and back again ever since the period
immediately preceding the Spanish-American War of 1898.
2. The United States, like every other major capitalist country, has
followed a policy of dollar diplomacy. Business men have been
encouraged by the Department of Commerce and other government agencies to set up profit-seeking enterprises beyond
United States frontiers. Behind these enterprises the government has put its diplomatic and consular services and various
government departments, including the army and navy.
3. Early in the 19th century the United States declared a policy
known as the Monroe Doctrine, under which the United
States refuses to permit any non-American power to establish
political or military control in the Western Hemisphere. The
Doctrine has been variously interpreted, but its basic conception is America for United States Americans.
4. United States policy in Europe; with minor exceptions, has
recently been governed by a willingness to accept and follow
the lead of London. Frequently the United States has been
consulted by London on issues involving American interests.
Even where such consultation has not taken place Washington has tended to follow London.
5. In A'sia, United States policy has been symbolized by the
Open Door: profit-seeking for all comers on the same nonmonopoly basis. Such a policy was inevitable in a market so
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thorDughly dominated by non-United States interests as was
Asia at the beginning of the present century.
6. The Pacific Ocean is, a special interest area for the United
States. There is as. yet no agreement as to' how that special
interest shall be interpreted. The United States borders the
Pacific. The construction Df the Panama Canal by the United
States marked an important step in Pacific development. As
wartorn Europe falls in relative planetary importance, Asia
rises relatively. The decline of Europe shrinks the significance
of the Atlantic in world affairs. The rise of Asia correspondingly enhances the Pacific. The United States' lies between the
two oceans. There is a strong probability that Pacific contrDI
will be as significant a determiner of world power in the next
hundred years as was the control of the Atlantic in the last
hundred. It is half a century since the United States secured
the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam and other Pacific stepping
stones. The Japanese challenge to United States Pacific CDntrol has been met with a fierce determination to devastate and
de-industrialize Japan.
Recent attempts have been made by Secretary of State Hull and
other official spokesmen to formulate United States foreign policy
in terms of democratic ideals, good neighborliness and moral correctness. Such statements have a certain propaganda value both at
home and abroad. Thev bear no relation to th~ facts of United
States foreign policy. If the above analyses of Soviet and United
States foreign interests and attitudes is correct, it must be abundantly evident that the general interests of the twO' countries. are
antithetical and that their specific interests are in conflict at a
number of important points.
Private individuals have sought to s~pplement or formulate
American foreign policy in terms of the wDrld power struggle.
Clarence Streit, for example, in his Union Now: A Proposal for a
Federal Union of the Leading Democracies (N. Y. Harper 1939)
advocated a grouping of the world's udemocracies" around a
British-American nucleus. The same theme was developed by
W. T. R. Fox in The Super Powers', Fox points out that ttboth
Britain and Britain's empire are essential to American security
because they provide the indispensable bases from which threats
79

to the United States from Old World aggressors can be stopped
within the Old World", (p.58) ' He notes that for half a century
"British interests in the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the
New World generally have not been supported by units of the
British Navy for forty years. The basic pattern thus emerges of an
informal global collaboration in which the Western Atlantic, the
New World, and the Pacific Ocean area are primary United States
responsibilities, with Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the
Middle East, and the Indian Ocean left in the first instance to
British protection." (Ibid, p. 59). He says that "a specific proposal has been made for enlarging the symbol, tUnited States', so
that it refers for security purposes at least, to the United States
plus Great Britain. Can it be further enlarged to include the
Soviet Union? (Ibid, p. 69) *. Walter Lippman (U. S. War Aims)
divides the western world into the Atlantic sea powers comprising ttthe Atlantic Community", and ttthe land power of Russia". The Atlantic Community includes besides those countries
bordering on the Atlantic, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Union of South Africa, Italy and Greece. In short, the
British and American Empire plus. their satellites. This Atlantic
Community ttis the historic centre of the international exchange
economy." (p. 86) Russia, although bordering on the Atlantic,
ttexists in and depends upon a region of strategic security separate
from the Atlantic powers." All three of these authors make
Anglo-American collaboration the key to future world order.
Several limitations. upon the Atlantic Community idea should be
noted. The first is the improbability of continued Anglo-American unity. The second is the drastic weakening of West Europe.
The third is the progressive disintegration of free enterprise
economy. The fourth, the rise of the Pacific as the strategic centre
of planetary life. It is impossible to develop anyone of these four
themes here. None can be ignored in an evaluation of the Atlantic Community concept as the basis. for American foreign policy.
United States insistence at the San Francisco Conference upon
the recognition of regionalism as embodied in the Act of Chapultapec supplemented the division of Europe into regions of
influence agreed upon at Teheran. The post-war world will evi-
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dently be regional in character without any strong central world
government. The two major poles in this regionally organized
world will be the United States and the Soviet Union. If British
policy follows the premise formulated in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty
of 1942, the British may well be drawn toward the Soviet centre
of world power. This will create a situation in which the United
States with its satellites and supporters will face the Soviet U nio11
with its satellites and supporters.
The Soviet Union and the United States are not involved in
any conflicts in the Western Hemisphere. The nearest approach
to such a situation was the United States support against Soviet
opposition, for the admission of the Argentine to the San Francisco Conference. In the Eastern Hemisphere, however, conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union has developed ,
over Iran, Poland, Austria, Trieste, Roumania and China. All
these territories are contiguous to the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union is not «interfering" in the Americas. The United States
is ((interfering" in Eurasia.
An indication of the tensions growing out of the juxtaposition
between the Soviet and United States poles of world influence is
found in the growing chorus of anti-Soviet propaganda. William
C. Bullitt, former United States Ambassador to Moscow, led off
with an article in Life, Sept. 4, 1944, in which he virtually said
that the United States must prepare for war against the Soviet
Union. Responsible United States spokesmen, including men well
placed in the Army and particularly in the Navy, for years had
been taking this position in private. Mr. Bullitt's utterance was
the first public semi-official statement of the attitude. The antiSoviet line has been followed by radio broadcasts, speeches and
other public pronouncements in which members of Congress,
prominent newspaper editors and other spokesmen for United
States business interests have attacked Soviet institutions, denounced Soviet policy in Poland, Austria, Roumania and elsewhere, and have begun to rally United States public opinion for
tithe inevitable conflict."
Soviet-American conflict is still in its early stages. It exists only
by implication in Lippman's Atlantic Community. Thus far it has
not been formulated publicly in the Soviet Union. Prominent
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United States officials, from the President down, continue to
insist upon the desirability of United States-Soviet friendship and
collaboration. There is no escape, however, from two major facts:
first, the world will emerge from World War II with no central
governmental authority; second, it will be a two pole world with
Moscow at one pole and Washington at the other.
ttWhat then are the prospects for a war between the Soviet
Eastern power-nucleus and the Anglo-American western aggregation? If either were to allow the other to consolidate the rimland
of the Eurasian land-mass under its control, it would also have
permitted its own power position vis-a-vis to the other to be
irretrievably damaged. Although a third world war is thus not
likely to start as a Soviet-Anglo-American war, an attempt by
either at sole hegemony in non-Russian Europe or Asia would
almost certainly finish as a Soviet-Anglo-American war. This is
almost the sole condition under which the two powers would
become polar opposites in a world war." (Fox, W. T. R. The
Super Powers, p. 103.) * Fox's statement seems accurate if it is
subj ect to one amendment. It now seems possible or even probable
that his first sentence should read tta war beween the Anglo-Soviet
Eastern power-nucleus and the American western aggregation".
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VI.

PEA CEO R WAR

FOR

THE

U.S.S.R.
International political power, in the final analysis, is tested by
the capacity to wage successful war. In a very real sense, however,
the success of national policy is in direct proportion to the avoidance of war" particularly of total war, which is so costly to the
victor as well as to the vanquished. Thus far in our consideration
of the Soviet role in world affairs we have discussed the power
position of the Soviet Union and analysed the policies which it
is pursuing in Europe, in Asia and in its relations with the United
States. Will ,these policies lead to peace or will they involve war?
This is one of the fateful political questions of our time.
Any observer of political events since 1917 must be convinced
that the Soviet Union wants peace. From those early days immediately after the revolution when the Russian Socialist Federal
Soviet Republic was broadcasting to the world: ttClose up your
ranks, proletarians of all countries, under the flag of peace and
the social revolution", down to the efforts made 'by the Soviet
Union to avoid involvement in World War II, Soviet spokesmen
have been among the world's most vocal advocates of a peaceful
solution for international tensions and conflicts.
The Bolsheviks gained power over the Kerensky regime for
several reasons. One of the principal reasons was the determination of the Kerensky regime to continue Russia in the war on the
side of the Allied nations. Bolshevik propaganda demanded the
cessation of hostilities, the election of delegates by soldiers, farmers and workers, all power to the Soviets so constituted, the convocation of a constituent assembly, the drafting of a constitution
and the establishment of a world-wide federation of peoples'
republics. Henri Barbusse edited a book, The Soviet Union and
Peace, in which many documents dealing with this phase of
Soviet policy are brought together.
Since the world revolution did not take place immediately after
World War I, and since no hope for peace lay in this direction,
the next formal move of the Soviet Union was an attempt to enforce those provisions in the League of Nations Covenant which
R~

called for disarmament. It was 1927 before the Disarmament
Commission in Geneva was seriously discussing the calling of a
general disarmament conference. Soviet delegations attended this
and subsequent meetings of the Disarmament Commission, presenting to each session some variant of a disarmament program.
One Soviet proposal was that "the Conference decides to base its
proceedings upon the principle of universal, complete disarmament". The Soviet delegation then offered a detailed list of the
steps necessary to achieve this objective: the destruction of fortifications, the liquidation of armies and navies, the disbandment
of war and navy departments, the cessation of arms manufacture,
the abolition of military and naval academies, and a number of
other measures designed to reduce or eliminate war-making possibilities. On another occasion Soviet delegates proposed that
forty percent of the world's armaments be eliminated the first
year, thir.ty percent the second year, and the remaining thirty percent the third year, thus substituting gradual disarmament for
immediate disarmament. Again, in the interest of the smaller
nations, Soviet spokesmen advocated disarmament for the great
powers first, and for the lesser powers only subsequently.
It goes without saying that these specific disarmament proposals received little support in groups composed of admirals, generals and diplomats, all of whom make their living and build their
reputations as a result of military preparation and the waging of
war. Furthermore,. the armament business was one of the most
prosperous and profitable branches of profit-economy, hence the
sessions of the Disarmament Commission were carefully shepherded by well-financed lobbyists of the big armament manufacturers who saw to it that any projected arms reduction program
was effectively pigeon-holed. The Soviet delegations to the Disarmament Commission did not achieve their objective of disarmament. On the contrary they saw the inauguration of the arms
building race that preceded World War II. But they did establish
for themselves and for the Soviet Union an enviable record as
advocates of a concrete disarmament program.
Long befo.re the Disarmament Conference faded out of the
international picture in 1934 Soviet spokesmen had decided upon
two courses of action. First, they would accept membership in the
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League Qf Nations, and second, from that vantage point they would
advocate a system of collective security based upon the League
Covenant and implemented by a series of treaties, under League
auspices, designed to inaugurate an effective scheme for checking
aggression and thus reducing the probability of war. On September 18, 1934, Litvinov speaking as head of the Russian delegatiQn
at Geneva said: · 'To many members of the League ten or fifteen
years ago war seemed to be a remote, theoretical danger and there
seemed to be no hurry as to' its prevention. Now war must appear
to all as the threatening danger of tomorrow. The organization of
peace, for which thus far very little has been dQne, must be set
against the extremely active organization of war. Everybody knows
now that the exponents of the idea of war, open promulgators of
a refashioning of the map of Europe and Asia by the sword, are
not to' be intimidated by paper obstacles. Peace and security cannot be organized Qn the shifting sands of verbal promises and decclarations." (League of Nations Official JournalJ Sept. 18, 1934.)
Another year and Litvinov, again speaking in the League
Assembly, was urging the immediacy of the war danger and the
necessity of concrete proposals to avert it. He suggested a Permanent Peace Conference as a substitute for the defunct Disarmament Conference; he suggested immediate, complete disarmament
as a more practicable step than partial disarmament; he suggested
League action ·'with a view to the complete outlawing Qf war";
he suggested the possibility of a «European Union" as one means
of adjusting the rising tensions between European nations. Soviet
spokesmen made further attempts to have the League define
aggression. In 1934-35 they negotiated treaties with Czechoslovakia and France which were designed to become a multilateral
pact to guarantee the collective security of Europe.
This is a considerable catalogue of Soviet peace advances. I present it for the purpose of emphasizing the active and persistent
part taken by Soviet delegations in every conference or assembly
where they had an opportunity to advance their point of view.
Sumner Welles sums up the Soviet role during this period:
«When the Soviet Union entered the League, even the most
obstinate were soon forced to admit that it was the only major
power which seemed to take the League seriously. The Soviet
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Government seemed to believe that the Covenant of the League
meant what it said. It seemed to feel that the Covenant was not
to be regarded merely as a screen for the achievement of each
country's individual and selfish purposes. The Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov . . . must be recognized as the only outstanding European statesman who was consistently right during
the years between the wars. It was Litvinov's constant appeal that
'peace is indivisible'; that the purposes of the Covenant of the
League of Nations could be achieved if the European powers
complied with its provisions . . . So long as he represented his
government in the League he strove with all his great ability to
make the League work." (The Time for Decision p.31) *
Questions have been raised regarding the sincerity of Soviet
spokesmen in calling for disarmament and collective security. Did
the Soviet Union really want peace, or did it aim at a curtailment
of arms making until it was in a position to out-arm the other
nations? There are several reasons for believing that the Soviet
Union had a vested interest in peace and was opposed to any resumption of war activity. In the. first place the Soviet Union was
led by men and women who had been schooled in the socialist
tradition of anti-militarism. One of the basic Marxian arguments
was that profit-making, empire-building, armament and war were
all parts of a unified pattern which was to be replaced by international socialism. During the years before 1914 the socialist parties of Europe were among the most vociferous opponents of
competitive militarism. Second, the Soviet leaders represented a
new and as yet unstable community just emerging from revolution and civil war. The stability of this community depended in
large measure upon a period of peace and relative order that
would permit concentration on the work of socialist construction.
In the third place, the energies of the Soviet Union were devoted,
not to profiteering at home and abroad but to the task of raising
the standard of community well-being. All three reasons gave the
Soviet Union a vested interest in peace and a motive for desiring
to avert another war.
Soviet spokesmen asked for peace repeatedly and insistently.
They got war.
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If there was a popular movement anywhere in the world during
the first quarter of the present century, it was the movement that
led to the overthrow of the Tzar's regime and the establishment of
the Soviet Republic. The movement was not only popular in the
Soviet Union but it commanded worldwide popular support. Here
lwas a reorganized community engaged in a social experiment of
vast proportions, seeking peace, bread and freedom. How did the
)alance of the world react to this effort of the Russian people to liberate themselves from an old tyranny, to free themselves from war
~nd to launch an effort looking toward worldwide cooperation?
1. The United States poured out scorn, derision, mendacity.
2. Japan occupied Manchuria and inaugurated a decade of border wars.
3. Great Britain organized the Munich encirclement.
4. Germany and Italy invaded the Soviet Union.
Through two decades the Soviet Union attempted by various
means to establish or to assist in establishing world conditions that
would ensure peca.(e and collective security. The effort failed. Late
in the 1930s, as the collapse of their peace policy became more
and more evident, Soviet officials turned their attention seriously
to war preparations. They had hoped to live in a peace world. They
found themselves in a war world and acted accordingly. Today the
Soviet Union is a world power, playing power politics, not because
Soviet spokesmen or the Russian people wished to occupy any such
role, but because they felt that their survival depended upon it.
In a very real sense, Soviet world policy today is Our Baby. We
have made it what it is. It is opposed to socialist theory and is
inimical to Soviet interests as these were conceived for fifteen
years after the Revolution. Soviet world policy is a departure
from world socialism and a reluctant adaptation necessitated by a
ring of armed imperial enemies.
Having adopted the war-making techniques of the empires,
the Soviet Union, after the Axis invasion, gave such a good military account of itself that it rose in a few months to a position
as one of the two or three major powers of the planet. Since 1943
Soviet spokesmen have been consulted on all major United
Nations policy, and since 1944 the Soviet Union has held the
diplomatic and military initiative in Europe.
87

NOVI that the European war has been won by the United Nations
and that the Big Three have succeeded in imposing their program
of world domination upon the San Francisco Conference, world
peace and security will depend upon the effectiveness with which
the Big Three work together. This proposition has been laid down
and widely accepted since the Teheran Conference in 1943. The
prospect of military victory carried with it the equally definite
prospect of world domination by those nations which controlled
the world's wealth, manpower and armaments. So long as these
power-holders cooperate, world peace can be enforced and world
security guaranteed. Soviet policy has thus entered a new phase.
First it stressed world revolution, then disarmament, then collective security and now Big Three unity. Implicit in the Big Three
unity policy, however, is another element-military might. This
aspect of Soviet policy has been reiterated ever since the surrender of Berlin in May 1945: the Red Army is strong and will
remain strong; the Red Navy will be strengthened.
Will Big Three unity provide peace and security for the Soviet
Union and the planet? The answer, of course, depends upon the
nature of that unity. How thoroughly are the Big Three united?
And how long will their union last?
Officially, the Big Three are united and have been ever since
their Teheran Declaration of 1943: ttFrom these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all the peoples of
the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according
to their varying desires and their own consciences. We came here
with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in
spirit, and in purpose." The declaration was signed by Roosevelt,
Stalin and Churchill. Eleven months later Prime Minister Churchill was making his. Oct. 27, 1944 report to Commons on his
Quebec conference with President Roosevelt and his Moscow conference with Marshall Stalin. The enemy, he said, has two hopes:
first that a long war will wear down the Allies. ttThe second and
more important hope is that division will arise between the three
great powers." The Prime Minister assumed the continuance of
Anglo-American cooperation. As for Russia: ((Our relations with
the Soviet Union were never more close, intimate and cordial
than .they are at the present time." (N. Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1944.)
88

Another four months, and President Roosevelt reported to Congress on the Yalta conference of the Big Three: nOn every point
unanimous agreement was reached . . . Never before have the
major Allies been more closely united-not Dnly in their war aims
but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to' continue
to be united." (N. Y. Time's, March 2, 1945.) Do these sentiments represent wishful thinking; are they propaganda slogans
for public consumption, or are they descriptive of political reality ?
Officially the Big Three are united. Actually, however, there
are increasing tensions among them. What are the reasons for this
tension? With the EurDpean phase of World War II ended and
the end of the Pacific War in sight, will the tensions increase or
decrease?
There has been a substantial change in the character of international tensions during recent years. From 1815 to 1905 international tensions arose mainly between competing capitalist and
imperialist groups. Incidentally, there were conflicts between imperial and colonial peoples, and within the hDmelands Df some of
the empires, notably those in Central Europe, minor conflicts occurred between the Drganized wage-workers and their capitalist
exploiters. Since 1905 the organized working class has pushed
steadily toward the forefront as a factor in international politics.
The defeat suffered by Russia at the hands of Japan in the war of
1904-5 helped to precipitate the Russian Revolution Df 1905. In
essence, this revolution was an attempt on the part of the Russian
business classes to win concessions from the ruling semi-feudal
bureacracy. During its course, hDwever, the Russian workers in
Petrograd and elsewhere organized soviets and made a definite
bid for power. At the same. time in other European countries, in
North America and in Australasia, working class parties were
winning elections, sending representatives to legislative bodies
and participating in the fDrmation of ministries. With the Russian Revolution of 191 7 these new class forces took power in a
major country, set up and maintained a political regime. Since
1917, therefore, every international situation has been complicated
by the actual or possible presence of working class forces. The
old tensions between competing imperialists have been supplemented by new tensions between exploiters and exploited.
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Tensions between the Big Three contain both elements. On the
)ne hand, the Big Three are the big Have nations. Britain controls the world's largest empire. The Soviet Union has the largest contiguous territory of any nation in the world. The United
States possesses the world's largest single unit of wealth and its
most prolific productive apparatus. These three nations at the
end of W orId War II will command the thre.e most powerful
armies, navies and air forces. In terms of old line power politics;
the Big Three will be the three big centre.s of production, income
and political might.
At the same time Britain is ruled by an oligarchy composed of
hereditary monarchist and aristocratic elements, coordinated with
a modern business class. The United States is ruled by a business
oligarchy. In both of these countries private property in the means
of production is the foundation of the economic pattern and the'
exploitation of wage labor and the production of commodities for
profit are the techniques pursued by the ruling oligarchies for their:
personal enrichment. The Soviet Union, on the other hand. is
ruled by a bureacracy composed originally of revolutionary leaders'
and recently augmented by additions from the ranks of technically
trained economic, military and social directors and managers. Private property in the means of production has been abolished, and
with it has gone the form of exploitation characteristic of AngloAmerican economy. On the surface the members of the Big Three
are armed sovereign states. In terms of class relationships they
represent two definitely antithetical social systems.
Big Three collaboration has passed through several well-marked
stages. Until 1942 the Soviet Union was hardly considered a nation
of first-class importance by the Anglo-American leaders. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had signed a collaboration pact with Nazi
Germany in 1939, and in the same year had launched a war against
Finland which had resulted in its expulsion from the League of
Nations and in a widespread anti-Soviet campaign in both Great
Britain and the United States. The successful defense of Stalingrad,
Leningrad and Moscow marked a turn in the Soviet fortunes of
war and led to the Teheran Conference of 1943 at which Soviet
representatives were for the first time accepted on a parity with
those from Great Britain and the United States. The war was still
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in full swing, however, and for another year the Big Three worked
together with little superficial disharmony, although some sharp
words were occasionally said about the failure of the western
powers to develop a second front. The summer of 1944, with its
successful cross-channel invasion and the rapid advance of the Red
Armies through southern and central Europe, saw a sharp shift in
attitudes. Members of the Big Three were no longer working in
harmony.
The first official recognition of disharmony was voiced by Prime
Minister Churchill, in his report to the House of Commons on
Oct. 27, 1944. The Prime Minister had discussed world affairs
with President Roosevelt in Quebec and with Marshal Stalin in
Moscow. Hyou would not expect three great powers so differently
circumstanced as Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia not
to have many differences in views about the treatment of the vari0us numerous countries into which their victorious armies have
carried them. The marvel is that all hitherto has been kept so solid,
sure and sound between us all." Mr. Churchill stated the case exactly. While the Big Three were engaged in a desperate indeterminate conflict they were able to maintain a large degree of unity.
With victory in sight the question of who shall have what, and
how, took precedence over the problem of survival.
HThere are great difficulties, but I earnestly hope that they may
be overcome," said the Prime Minister in the same speech. "The
most urgent and burning question was, of course, that of Poland,
and here again I speak words of hope reinforced by confidence.
To abandon hope in this matter would indeed be to surrender to
despair." Mr. Churchill added, HI wish I could tell the House
that we had reached a solution of these problems. It is certainly
not for the want of trying."
Twice during the speech Prime Minister Churchill reverted to
his major theme. On one occasion he said ttThe future of the
whole world and the general future of Europe, perhaps for several
generations, depends upon the cordial, trustful and comprehending
associations of the British Empire, the United States and Soviet
Russia, and no pains must be spared and no patience grudged
which is necessary to bring this supreme hope to fruition." At
another point, after a careful statement of the dangers that would
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result from disunity among the Big Three: "The future of the
world depends upon united action in the next few years of our
three countries. Other countries will be associated, but the future
depends upon the union of the three most powerful Allies. If
that fails, all fails. If that succe.eds a broad future for all nations
may be assured."
Mr. Churchill stated the case very strongly when he said that
if the Big Three unity fails "all fails". Certainly his recent experiences at Quebec, and particulary at Moscow, had led him to take
a very serious view of the possibilities and dangers of Big Three
disagreement.
Ten days after Churchill's address to the House of Commons,
Premier Stalin gave his report at the anniversary of the November
Revolution. His premises were very much the same as those of
Mr. Churchill. "There is a talk of differences between the three
powers on certain security problems. Differences do exist, of
course. . . . The surprising thing is not that differences exist,
but that there are so few of them." His outlook for the fuhue
was cautiously worded. "The alliance between U.S.S.R., Great
Britain and U.S.A. is founded not on casual and short-lived considerations but on vital and lasting interests. There can be no
doubt that having stood the strain of over three years of war and
being sealed with the blood of nations risen in defense of thei~
liberty and honor, the fighting alliance of the democratic powers
will all the more certainly stand the strain of the concluding
phase of the war." (U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin} Nov. 14,
1944, p. 4-5.) It is significant that Stalin saw Big Three unity
continuing through the concluding phase of the war. He does
not mention post-war possibilities.
The actual course of events during the first months of 1945
more than justified the Stalin outlook. The war in Europe was
not yet over, though it had reached its final stage. The Red
Armies had been remarkably successful in occupying not only
Balkan and Polish but also German territory. The Anglo-American forces had been unexpectedly delayed in their penetration of
Germany. While there was no actual race to reach Berlin, the
spheres of control in Germany which had already been laid out
were taken over by the four invading powers. At the same time
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the future of other parts of Europe and Asia Minor was being
determined. Here was the supreme test of Big Three unity. They
had been able to work together during the war. Could they continue their cooperation when it came to dividing the booty?
Again and again history has repeated the same story. Military
alliances among victor nations have dissolved, and frequently
have ended in conflict, because the allies could not agree upon a
division of the spoils of war. The Big Three are re-enacting the
oft-re.peated historical drama.
Big Three, or Big Five unity has cracked in various directions.
Good intentions and fair words cannot cover up the rifts which
first pressed themselves on public attention during the summer of
1944. There was a formal conflict at Dumbarton Oaks, centering
about council voting procedure. No agreement was reached and
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were published with this note appearing in parentheses under Section C of Chapter VI: "The
question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under
consideration". This document (Department of State Publication
2192) was dated Oct. 7, 1944. Five months later, at the Yalta
Big Three Conference, a voting formula was verbally agreed
upon, only to be sharply fought out at the San Francisco Conference seSSIons.
A second formal issue arose at Dumbarton Oaks. The Soviet
delegates refused to meet with dele.gates from Chungking. Consequently two conferences were held, the. main conference betNeen
Britain, the United States and ·the Soviet Union, and a subsequent
conference between Britain, the United States and China.
Preparations for the Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, Nov.
1, 1944, included the Soviet ynion as a matter of course. A
Soviet delegation was sent to the Conference, but at the last moment it withdrew and returned to Russia. The official Soviet Tass
Agency, in a broadcast on Oct. 29 (N. Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1944)
explained the withdrawal: "In view of the fact, which has recently become known, that countries like Switzerland, Portugal and
Spain have also been invited to the Chicago Conference, countries
that for many years have conducted a pro-fascist policy hostile to
the Soviet Union, the representatives of the Soviet Union will not
take part in this conference." Again the rift was over a matter of
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procedure. But the Soviet Union, one of the three most important
air powers, took no part in the Civil Aviation Conference.
A far more substantial conflict developed during 1944 over
Persian oil. The matter was sufficiently dealt with in our discussion of Soviet policy in Asia. Here it is only necessary to note
that the issue still remains unsettled.
One of the sharpest cleavages between members of the Big
Three arose over Poland. That issue was discussed in our consideration of Soviet policy in Europe. Through the latter part of
1944 and the early months of 1945 it remained, as Prime Minister Churchill described it: Uthe most urgent and burning question" dividing the Big Three.
Not the least urgent among the Big Three controversies was the
problem of enlarging the triumvirate so that it might include an
Asiatic and a west European continental power. China was picked
for Asia because there was no alternative. But which China? For
years Chungking China, supported by the United States, had been
making war on Soviet China, backed by the U.S.S.R.
France, as a member of the United Nations oligarchy, presented
an even more knotty problem than did China. In November 1943
Marshal Smuts dismissed France in his speech before the Empire
Parliamentary Association in London: ((France has gone, and if
ever she returns it will be a hard and long upward pull for her to
emerge .again." Difficulties arose between Great Britain and the
United States over the leadership of a reconstituted France. Britain
favored de Gaulle; the United States backed Darlan. De Gaulle's
visits to London and Washington failed to gain concessions from
either country. After the June 1944 invasion of France, de Gaulle
was perforce recognized as head of the French Provisional Government. In December 1944 de Gaulle scored an important victory in the form of the French-Russian Treaty. But when plans
were being made for the Yalta Conference, the Big Three decided
not to include de Gaulle, whereupon the French Government
refused to participate as one of the sponsors of the San Francisco
Conference. Paris, dissatisfied with the allocation of German territory for French occupation seized Italian territory along the
French-Italian frontier and came close to an open break with
Great Britain in the Syrian crisis of May-June 1945.
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There are two other areas of Big Three disunity. The first has
to do with the administration of Germany, and the second with
the Pacific War. Theoretically, German administration is in the
hands of an Allied Control Commission. Practically, each of the
four occupying powers is going its own way in its own occupation zone. As for the Pacific War, after years of conflict the
United States and Great Britain are fighting against Japan, with
whom the Soviet Union is still allied.
These specific areas of Big Three disagreement arise not only
out of divergent interests but more particularly out of the acceptance of the principles of national sovereignty. During the
entire history of the United Nations, organized in 1942, the principle of national sovereignty has been upheld and defended by
representatives of all major powers. In the past two years the
principle has been expanded into regionalism or spheres of influence, each under the direction of a major power. It seems probable that the regional principle was accepted at Teheran and
implemented either there or at Yalta by an agreement under
which the Americas became the United States sphere, East Europe
became the Soviet sphere, leaving West Europe and the Mediterranean to Great Britain. Active measures were taken by the Soviet
Union in the summer of 1944 to occupy its area with military
forces. In December 1944 British action in Greece earmarked that
country as a part of the British sphere. The United States proceeded, unchallenged, with its private war on the Argentine and
immediately before the San Francisco Conference, called together
a Pan-American group in Mexico City, secured the adoption of a
regional agreement and carried this agreement to the San Francisco Conference as an essential element in United Nations
organization.
Before the term "regionalism" is accepted, it is important to
inquire regions of what? These territories were always regions of
the earth's land mass. Beyond that, they have no significance
except in so far as they can be dominated by armed, master states.
If a world government had been established, they might well be
described as regions under the world authority. But since there
is no world government, and since each region is sovereign, and
subject to the will of a master nation, the newly constituted re95

gion appears as a slightly modified form of the old sphere of influence, consisting of territory not politically integrated with but
subject to the dictates of a master state.
Within their respective regions the Big Three are practicing
unilateral action in very much the same way that a sovereign state
acts within its own frontiers. The Soviet handling of Roumania,
the British handling of Italy and Greece in the autumn of 1944,
and British action in Syria in 1945, like United States action in
the Argentine, were accepted just as any domestic action is accepted by the government of a neighbor state. There was obvious
disagreement between the United States and Russia over Roumania, and between the United States and Britain over Italy. Protests
are frequently made, however, when a domestic action of a government infringes the interests of a neighboring government.
Big Three practices accept unilateral action as normal, within
designated spheres of influence or regions. United action is by
special agreement only. The difficulty over the enlargement of the
Polish Government after Yalta, and the setting up of the Austrian Government by the Soviet Union without consultation, arose
because the three powers had agreed on a particular formula for
these cases.
National sovereignty and regionalism, or master national
spheres of influence, have both been institutionalized at San Francisco. In the Security Council each one of the master nations
holds a veto power which is a guarantee against interference
within its own area of influence. Each of the master nations also
retains its arms and its facilities for arms manufacture. The
United Nations as constituted will be ruled over by a small oligarchy of the rich and strong. If this oligarchy is taken to
include the Big Five it will comprise ten percent of the total
membership in the United Nations. In reality, of course, the oligarchy numbers three and thus comprises something more than
six percent of the total membership. No provision is made and
no means are available to protect the interests of small weak
nations against aggressions by the oligarchy unless all of the
oligarchs agree on the desirability of such action.
If the master nations disagree, there will be war. Secretary of
State Stettinius recognized this fact quite frankly in his radio
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broadcast of May 28, 1945: nWhat happens if one of the five
permanent members embarks upon a course of aggression and
refuses to recognize the machinery of the world organization?
How can the aggressor be restrained if his 071n contrary vote prevents the Council from invoking force against him? In such an
event, the answer is simple. Another world war has come, vote
or no vote, and the world organization has failed."
This entire analysis permits of but one conclusion. The Soviet
Union has become part of the Western State System in which war
has been and still is the accepted means of deciding major issues.
None of the international conferences recently held has in any
way modified the basic principles of national sovereignty nor set
up any institutional means of restraining a master nation from
going to war when it considers that its interests demand military
actiO'n. Under these circumstances:
1. Peace will continue as long as the master nation oligarchy is
in agreement.
2. The master nations have been disunited, and on specific issues
in open conflict since the. summer of 1944..
3. The poles of antagonism are well defined. The post-war world
will be a twO' pole world divided along lines of national and
class interests.
4. It is not yet clear how the lesser powers, and especially Great
Britain, will group themselves, but it seems inreasingly probable that the Soviet Union will control the major porti03 of
Europe"s resources and productive tools as well as important
areas in non-Russian Asia. There is also a possibility if not a
probability that the British, in line with the policy embodied
in the Anglo-Soviet Pact of 1942, may cast in their lot with
the Soviet Union Dn many issues of planet-wide policy.
5. After the war in the Pacific is ended there will be little demobilization and no disarmament, except of the defeated
powers. On the contrary, military preparations will be stepped
up, conscription and military training will both be extended,
and every effort will be made to' prepare for the next war.
The U.S.S.R. must fight again, not of her choosing but of the
necessity which is inherent in the Western State System. Had a
world government been set up at San Francisco or if there were
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any immediate prospect of establishing a world government, the
perspective would be otherwise. With the old established principles of national sovereignty still in full force and unrestrained
by any world state apparatus, it seems· obvious that procedutes
under the Western State System will continue in the future along
substantially the same lines that .they have followed in the past.
One final point should be noted: time works for the Soviet
Union. A new social order, moving with the social trends and
self-sufficient to a degree impossible under a profit-price economy,
should gain in strength with each passing year. Each year that war
is postponed is one more year in the task of socialist construction.
Thus the Soviet Union continues to have a vested interest in peace..
Only the Soviet Union can afford peace, however. The other
master nations, dependent upon profit-price economies, cannot
tolerate it. They can hope to provide full employment only on the
basis of military preparednes and war. Without full employment
there is no remote possibility of preserving ·the status quo in free
enterprise society. Without war, the new social order, represented
by the Soviet Union, will inexorably outdistance free enterprise
economy. Thus the system of free enterprise has a vested interest
in war just as surely as the Soviet Union has a vested !nterest in
peace.
The next war within the Western State System will not be initiated by the Soviet Union. If it becomes a general war with the
same totalitarian character as World Wars I and II, it will destroy
free enterprise economy in the Americas as surely as World War
II crumpled up the same economy in Europe. If the Soviet Union
can survive the next war it will serve as the prototype of the new
social order that will replace the Western State System and will
thus serve as the transfer agent to carry the mechanical and social
techniques across the chasm that separates the old world order
from the new.
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POSTSCRIPT:
THE GAME OF POWER POLI T ICS
The topic for this series of discussions is the Soviet role in world
affairs. Emphasis has been placed on "Soviet" rather than "world
affairs" because that was the corner of the field that we set out to
examine. Nevertheless "world affairs" is a far broader and more
inclusive theme than "Soviet". There were world affairs or international relations before the Soviet Union came into existence.
Relations between the nations are older than written history. They
provide much of the subject matter of history as it is usually presented. So having devoted an entire lecture series to the Soviet
aspect of this problem, I want to treat international relations or
power politics in this brief postscript. Throughout this series of
talks I have taken the pattern of international life as the background against which to consider Soviet foreign policy. I have
neither questioned the pattern nor attempted to evaluate it. Now
the time has come to describe it briefly and say a few words aBout.
its social and ethical import.
In our last discussion of Peace or War for the Soviet Union I
attempted to show that Soviet spokesmen first opposed the international pattern in principle, then tried to modify some of its more
objectionable features and only as a last resort adjusted their
policy to its total-war standards. One of the earliest acts of the
Bolshevik Government was to propose a worldwide revolution that
would overthrow capitalist states and empires, and substitute for
them a world government organized by representatives of the
world's peoples. Such a move, if successful, would have replaced
competing nationalisms and imperialisms by a coordinated and
perhaps by a cooperative world community.
Bolshevik efforts in this direction failed. Consequently we find
ourselves today living under a system of world politics that is
practically the same in principle as it was when men plodded along
mud roads behind horses and oxen, moved across water in sailing
ships, and spoke to each other only by word of mouth or by letter
and printing press.
Shelves of books have been written about world politics. R. P.
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Dutt's World Politics (N. Y.: International, 1936) is a good
treatment of the subject from the left. N. J. Spykman's America's
Strategy i n World Politics (N. Y.: Harcourt, 1942) presents
the theme in geo-political terms. F. L. Schuman's International
Politics (N. Y., McGraw Hill, 1933) is a standard college. textbook. These and scores of other recent studies explain the workings of world politics or power politics. One of these days I shall
prepare a series of lectures on this theme. Right now I should like
to present a thumb-nail sketch of the subj ect.
1. World politics or power politics. is intercourse-peaceful or

warlike-between governments of sovereign states.
2. In the absence of a world government, with sovereign power,

the planet is essentially law-less. Each nation makes its. own
laws, and formulates its own policies often with little or no
regard for the well-being of its neighbors who are engaged in
like nationalist practices. Under such a set-up, friction and
conflict are inevitable, and the ultimate decisions are made by
a resort to war.
3. Business for profit and the will to power both drive national
policy makers into. a competitive struggle for economic, political and social advantage or privilege.
4. Urged on by this drive, individuals already rich strive to augment their wealth, and powerful nations seek additional power.
5. Recent centuries of world power struggle have involved:
a. World supremacy for a series of nations: Spain, Holland,
France, Britain,
b. Gained through the defeat and often through the destruction of their rivals,
c. And through the extension, by armed force, of imperial
control over dependent and colonial peoples.
d. Some colonial people like the English colonies of North
America and the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of Latin
America have thrown off the yoke of empire and become
sovereign states, competing in .their turn for wealth and
power.
e. The power struggle has been wage.d with all of the
weapons in the hands of the power seekers. War has been
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going on in some part of the empire-dominated world
about nine years out of every ten.
6. The international power struggle is carried on ruthlessly. It is
impossible to understand the game of p071er politics unless
you remember that it has no rules, no ethics and no morals.
It is a life and death grapple in which no holds are barred.
7. The power politics game goes on incessantly between foreign
ministers and other government agents who sneak, spy,
double-cross, cheat, lie, bribe, steal, burn and kill to advance
the interests of ttour country" and to out-maneuver the
"enemy" (all other countries).
8. At irregular intervals, when small scale spying, cheating,
double-crossing, lying, debauchery, ,theft, incendiarism and
murder will no longer secure the desired results, the total
resources of the fatherland are mobilized against the enemy.
Economy, science, the radio, the press, the screen, the school,
the church and every other available agency are pressed into
service for a campaign of organized destruction, rapine and
mass murder called total war.
9. Since the final test of success in the power-politics game is
military victory, no pains are spared to destroy, burn and kill
to the utmost. Recently developed mechanical and automatic
weapons enable the users to wipe out towns and cities in a
few hours and to devastate entire countries in a few months.
10. Military victory carries with it the right to appropriate the
movable property of the vanquished; to take title to the natural resources within enemy territory; to humiliate, enslave,
execute. Glory to the victor! Woe to the vanquished! '
11. This is the power politics game-the sport of kings and the
king of sports. Not only does it make or ruin individuals, but
it creates and annihilates nations and entire cultures.
12. Our best people dedicate their talents and their lives to the
game of power politics. Those who lead their fellows to victory
are acclaimed and honored. Those who lead their fellows to
defeat are usually cursed and forgotten. Power-hungry, cynical,
greedy, ignorant, cruel manipulators, in the name of defense,
patriotism, national honor, survival, sacrifice the happiness and
well-being of multitudes on the altar of greed and violence.
101

Through the ages thinkers and teachers. have tried to formulate
rules of conduct under which human life would be dignified and
exalted. They have spoken of understanding, sympathy, compassion, brotherhood; of devotion to truth, beauty and goodness; of
generosity, sharing, cooperation. Judged by any such standards,
power politics is a dirty game, unworthy the time and energy of
any man or woman of good-will.
Civilized communities have deified the state and have accepted
the power-politics game as a necessary accompaniment of state
sovereignty. The absence of rules, ethics and morals in the game
has been excused on the grounds that (1) ttIt is our country,
right or wrong", (2) ttEverybody is doing if', and (3) 1t(We are
in it now and we must go through with it". Spokesmen for this
pattern of western life conveniently forget that ttthey who take
. victor and vanquished alike.
the sword, perish by the sword' ' Yet this must be true, because war is waged between groups of
human beings in terms of fear, hate, deliberate devastation and
premeditated, planned killing.
No community can hope to endure which does not establish and
maintain social standards that conserve and build. The power politics game is organized and played in terms of destruction.
No community can hope to endure. which does not develop
techniques of cooperation and mutual aid. Power politics practices cutthroat competition.
No community can hope to endure which does not work out
ethical and moral codes under which human decencies are preserved, human worthiness is elli~anced and men learn the hard
lesson of live and help live. Power politics is based on the assumption that every person across the frontier is a potential enemy, to
be suspected, feared and hated in peacetime and in wartime, to be
murdered at the command of the state.
Power politics contravenes every concept of popular sovereignty, every principle of fair dealing, every code of udo unto others",
every teaching of brotherhood. Either we follow the precepts laid
down bv the leading ethical teachers or else we take part in the
power politics game. There is no middle way.
Soviet leaders entered the power politics game not because they
liked it but because they felt that there w;.s no alternative. They
102

have been calling for another game, with decent rules and new
players. How can any man or woman of good will fail to sympathize with Soviet spokesmen in their heroic efforts for world peace
and security and to afford them every assistance in their struggle
to replace power politics by a planned, ordered, governed world
community?
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